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Cybereason: All Results Tactic Page Information

The ATT&CK All Results page displays the procedures, tested techniques, and detection results for all steps in an evaluation. The Procedure column contains a description of how the technique in the corresponding technique column was tested. The Step column is where in the operational flow the procedure occurred. Click the Step Number to view it in the Operational Flow panel. Detections are classified by one or more Detection Types, summarized by the Detection Notes, and may be supported by Screenshots. The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

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Overview Matrix JSON Legend
Legend
Main Detection Categories: Detection Modifiers:

None

Telemetry

Indicator of
Compromise

General
Behavior

MSSP

General

Tactic

Specific
Behavior

Technique

Enrichment

Tainted

Alert

Correlated

Delayed

Host
Interrogation

Residual
Artifact

Configuration
Change

Innovative
Step
Procedures Criteria
Technique
Detection Type Detection Notes
1.A.1
User Pam executed payload rcs.3aka3.doc The rcs.3aka3.doc process spawning from explorer.exe
User Execution
(T1204)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red; unique symbol) called "User Execution" was generated due to explorer.exe executing rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
General (Alert)
A General alert detection was generated for rcs.3aka3.doc being identified as unknown malware. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed explorer.exe executing rcs.3aka3.doc. [1] [2]
1.A.2
Used unicode right-to-left override (RTLO) character to obfuscate file name rcs.3aka3.doc (originally cod.3aka.scr) Evidence of the right-to-left override character (U+202E) in the rcs.3aka.doc process ​OR the original filename (cod.3aka.scr)
Masquerading
(T1036)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red indicator) was generated for a payload using the RTLO character to manipulate and obscure the payload's extension. [1]
1.A.3
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.5) via rcs.3aka3.doc payload over TCP port 1234 Established network channel over port 1234
Uncommonly Used Port
(T1065)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the rcs.3aka3.doc process connecting to 192.168.0.5 on TCP port 1234. [1]
1.A.4
Used RC4 stream cipher to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed rcs.3aka3.doc loading cryptographic libraries. [1] [2]
1.B.1
Spawned interactive cmd.exe cmd.exe spawning from the rcs.3aka3.doc​ process
Command-Line Interface
(T1059)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of cmd.exe spawning from rcs.3aka3.doc​. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed cmd.exe spawning from rcs.3aka3.doc​. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
1.B.2
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe spawning from cmd.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of powershell.exe spawning from cmd.exe. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed powershell.exe spawning from cmd.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
2.A.1
Searched filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
General (Alert, Configuration Change (Detections))
A General alert detection was generated for powershell.exe executing Get-ChildItem. A sensor policy update that enables deeper PowerShell visibility was re-applied. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "PowerShell activity looking for files in a directory" occurred containing evidence of a file event for powershell.exe executing ChildItem. [1]
2.A.2
Scripted search of filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem
Automated Collection
(T1119)
General (Configuration Change (Detections), Alert)
A General alert detection for "malicious command" was generated on powershell.exe executing Get-ChildItem. A sensor policy update that enables deeper PowerShell visibility was re-applied. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "PowerShell activity looking for files in a directory" occurred containing evidence of a file event and powershell.exe executing ChildItem. [1]
2.A.3
Recursively collected files found in C:\Users\Pam\ using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\Pam\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "PowerShell activity looking for files in a directory T1005" occurred containing evidence of a file event for powershell.exe reading files from Pam's system. [1] [2]
Telemetry (Configuration Change (Detections), Correlated)
Telemetry showed file opens of C:\Users\Pam\*. The event was correlated to a parent General detection rcs.3aka3.doc being identified as unknown malware. A sensor policy update that enables file read event collection was re-applied. [1] [2]
2.A.4
Compressed and stored files into ZIP (Draft.zip) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Compress-Archive
Data Compressed
(T1002)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "PowerShell activity looking for files in a directory" occurred containing evidence of powershell.exe compressing via Compress-Archive. [1] [2]
2.A.5
Staged files for exfiltration into ZIP (Draft.zip) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file draft.zip
Data Staged
(T1074)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for Data Staged occurred containing evidence of the creation of the file Draft.zip. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed file creation of Draft.zip. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
2.B.1
Read and downloaded ZIP (Draft.zip) over C2 channel (192.168.0.5 over TCP port 1234) The rcs.3aka3.doc process reading the file draft.zip while connected to the C2 channel
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
(T1041)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed file read event for Draft.zip and an existing C2 channel (192.168.0.5 over port 1234). The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
3.A.1
Dropped stage 2 payload (monkey.png) to disk The rcs.3aka3.doc process creating the file monkey.png
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed rcs.3aka3.doc creating monkey.png. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
3.A.2
Embedded PowerShell payload in monkey.png using steganography Evidence that a PowerShell payload was within monkey.png
Obfuscated Files or Information
(T1027)
General (Correlated, Alert)
A General alert detection was generated for a malicious PowerShell process that showed the PowerShell script contained within monkey.png. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1] [2]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Obfuscated Files or Information" occurred containing evidence of the PowerShell script contained within monkey.png. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed PowerShell extracting and executing the code embedded within monkey.png. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
3.B.1
Modified the Registry to enable COM hijacking of sdclt.exe using PowerShell Addition of the DelegateExecute ​subkey in ​HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\​​command​​
Component Object Model Hijacking
(T1122)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "COM Hijacking (T1122)" occurred containing evidence of the addition of the DelegateExecute Registry Value. [1]
Telemetry (Configuration Change (Detections))
Telemetry showed the addition of the DelegateExecute Registry Value. For the Configuration Change, the PowerShell detection policy was disabled. [1]
3.B.2
Executed elevated PowerShell payload High integrity powershell.exe spawning from control.exe​​ (spawned from sdclt.exe)
Bypass User Account Control
(T1088)
General (Correlated, Alert)
A General alert detection (red; unique symbol) for malicious PowerShell was generated for new high integrity PowerShell callback spawning from control.exe​​. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed control.exe creating a high integrity powershell.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
3.B.3
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.5) via PowerShell payload over TCP port 443 Established network channel over port 443
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed powershell.exe connecting to 192.168.0.5 on port 443. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
3.B.4
Used HTTPS to transport C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is HTTPS
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed the loading of cryptographic libraries.
3.B.5
Used HTTPS to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed the loading of cryptographic libraries.
3.C.1
Modified the Registry to remove artifacts of COM hijacking Deletion of of the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\Open\command subkey
Modify Registry
(T1112)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.A.1
Dropped additional tools (SysinternalsSuite.zip) to disk over C2 channel (192.168.0.5) powershell.exe creating the file SysinternalsSuite.zip
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed the file write of the ZIP by PowerShell. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1] [2]
4.A.2
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe spawning from powershell.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection (red; unique symbol) for "Malicious Process powershell.exe" was generated due to suspicious use of PowerShell. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for User Execution of rcs.3aka3.doc. [1] [2]
4.A.3
Decompressed ZIP (SysinternalsSuite.zip) file using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Expand-Archive
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed PowerShell writing the files that were decompressed from the ZIP. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1]
4.B.1
Enumerated current running processes using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.B.2
Deleted rcs.3aka3.doc on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file rcs.3aka3.doc
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete.exe running with command-line arguments to delete the file and the subsequent file rename and delete events. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1] [2] [3] [4]
4.B.3
Deleted Draft.zip on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file draft.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete.exe running with command-line arguments to delete the file and the subsequent file rename and delete events. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1] [2] [3] [4]
4.B.4
Deleted SysinternalsSuite.zip on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file SysinternalsSuite.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete.exe running with command-line arguments to delete the file and the subsequent file rename and delete events. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1] [2] [3] [4]
4.C.1
Enumerated user's temporary directory path using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:TEMP
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.2
Enumerated the current username using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:USERNAME
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Discovery - System Owner/User Discovery" occurred containing evidence of PowerShell executing: $env:USERNAME. [1]
4.C.3
Enumerated the computer hostname using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:COMPUTERNAME
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.4
Enumerated the current domain name using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:USERDOMAIN
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.5
Enumerated the current process ID using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $PID
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.6
Enumerated the OS version using PowerShell powershell.exe executing​ Gwmi Win32_OperatingSystem
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.7
Enumerated anti-virus software using PowerShell powershell.exe executing​ Get-WmiObject ...​ -Class AntiVirusProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for Security Software Discovery occurred containing evidence of powershell executing Get-WmiObject and -Class AntiVirusProduct. [1] [2]
4.C.8
Enumerated firewall software using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-WmiObject ...​​ -Class FireWallProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Enumeration Invoke-Discovery" occurred containing evidence of powershell.exe executing: Get-WmiObject ...​​ -Class FireWallProduct. [1]
4.C.9
Enumerated user's domain group membership via the NetUserGetGroups API powershell.exe executing the NetUserGetGroups API
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Enumeration Invoke-Discovery" occurred containing evidence of the NetUserGetGroups API call. [1] [2]
4.C.10
Executed API call by reflectively loading Netapi32.dll The NetUserGetGroups API function loaded into powershell.exe from Netapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Invoke-NetUserGetGroups (psreflect)" occurred containing evidence of the NetUserGetGroups API function loaded into PowerShell from Netapi32.dll. [1]
4.C.11
Enumerated user's local group membership via the NetUserGetLocalGroups API powershell.exe executing the NetUserGetLocalGroups API
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Invoke-NetUserGetLocalGroups (psreflect)" occurred containing evidence of the NetUserGetLocalGroups API call. [1]
4.C.12
Executed API call by reflectively loading Netapi32.dll The NetUserGetLocalGroups API function loaded into powershelle.exe from Netapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Invoke-NetUserGetLocalGroups (psreflect)" occurred containing evidence of the NetUserGetLocalGroups API function loaded into PowerShell from Netapi32.dll. [1]
5.A.1
Created a new service (javamtsup) that executes a service binary (javamtsup.exe) at system startup powershell.exe creating the Javamtsup service
New Service
(T1050)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed the creation of javamtsup service. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1] [2]
5.B.1
Created a LNK file (hostui.lnk) in the Startup folder that executes on login powershell.exe creating the file hostui.lnk in the Startup folder
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Invoke-Persistence (persistence via shortcut/run key)" occurred containing evidence of the PowerShell creating the hostui.lnk file. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed the file write of hostui.lnk in the Startup folder. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1]
6.A.1
Read the Chrome SQL database file to extract encrypted credentials accesschk.exe reading files within %APPDATALOCAL%\Google\chrome\user data\default\
Credentials in Files
(T1081)
Telemetry (Configuration Change (Detections), Correlated)
Telemetry showed accesschk.exe reading the Chrome database file for credentials. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. A sensor policy update that enables file read event collection was re-applied. [1]
6.A.2
Executed the CryptUnprotectedData API call to decrypt Chrome passwords accesschk.exe executing the CryptUnprotectedData API
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
6.A.3
Masqueraded a Chrome password dump tool as accesscheck.exe, a legitimate Sysinternals tool Evidence that accesschk.exe is not the legitimate Sysinternals tool
Masquerading
(T1036)
General (Correlated, Alert)
A General alert detection (red indicator) was generated for accesschk.exe being an unsigned file with a known signed version. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1]
6.B.1
Exported a local certificate to a PFX file using PowerShell powershell.exe creating a certificate file exported from the system
Private Keys
(T1145)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed file create event for a $RandomFileName.pfx file by powershell.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1]
6.C.1
Dumped password hashes from the Windows Registry by injecting a malicious DLL into Lsass.exe powershell.exe injecting into lsass.exe OR lsass.exe reading Registry keys under HKLM:\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection (red; unique symbol) called "Credential Theft" was generated due to powershell.exe injection into lsass.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1] [2]
7.A.1
Captured and saved screenshots using PowerShell powershell.exe executing the CopyFromScreen function from System.Drawing.dll
Screen Capture
(T1113)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
7.A.2
Captured clipboard contents using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Clipboard
Clipboard Data
(T1115)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
7.A.3
Captured user keystrokes using the GetAsyncKeyState API powershell.exe executing the GetAsyncKeyState API
Input Capture
(T1056)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
7.B.1
Read data in the user's Downloads directory using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\pam\Downloads\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
Telemetry (Configuration Change (Detections), Correlated)
Telemetry showed Powershell.exe reading files from C:\Users\pam\Downloads. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. A sensor policy update that enables file read event collection was re-applied. [1] [2]
7.B.2
Compressed data from the user's Downloads directory into a ZIP file (OfficeSupplies.7z) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file OfficeSupplies.7z
Data Compressed
(T1002)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed the file create event for OfficeSupplies.7z. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1]
7.B.3
Encrypted data from the user's Downloads directory using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Compress-7Zip with the password argument used for encryption
Data Encrypted
(T1022)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
7.B.4
Exfiltrated collection (OfficeSupplies.7z) to WebDAV network share using PowerShell powershell executing Copy-Item pointing to an attack-controlled WebDav network share (192.168.0.4:80)
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
(T1048)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed PoweShell creating OfficeSupplies.7z on a remote adversary WebDav network share (192.168.0.4). The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1]
8.A.1
Enumerated remote systems using LDAP queries powershell.exe making LDAP queries over port 389 to the Domain Controller (10.0.0.4)
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
8.A.2
Established WinRM connection to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) Network connection to Scranton (10.0.1.4) over port 5985
Windows Remote Management
(T1028)
Technique (Correlated, Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red indicator) called "Windows Remote Management" was generated due to the connection to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) over port 5985. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1] [2]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Windows Remote Management" occurred containing evidence of the connection to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) over port 5985. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a connection to Scranton (10.0.1.4) over port 5985. [1]
8.A.3
Enumerated processes on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
General (Configuration Change (Detections), Alert)
A General alert detection called "Malicious Command" was generated for wsmprovhost.exe executing Get-Process. A sensor policy update that enables deeper PowerShell visibility was re-applied. [1]
8.B.1
Copied python.exe payload from a WebDAV share (192.168.0.4) to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) The file python.exe created on Scranton (10.0.1.4)
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a file write event of python.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1]
8.B.2
python.exe payload was packed with UPX Evidence that the file python.exe is packed
Software Packing
(T1045)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Defense Evasion - Software Packing" showed python.exe was packed. [1]
8.C.1
Logged on to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) using valid credentials for user Pam Successful logon as user Pam on Scranton (10.0.1.4)
Valid Accounts
(T1078)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a valid logon on Scranton (10.0.1.4) as user Pam. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1]
8.C.2
Established SMB session to remote host Scranton's (10.0.1.4) IPC$ share using PsExec SMB session to Scanton (10.0.1.4) over TCP port 445/135 OR evidence of usage of a Windows share
Windows Admin Shares
(T1077)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed an SMB session from Nashua (10.0.1.6) to Scranton (10.0.1.4) over TCP port 135. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1]
8.C.3
Executed python.exe using PSExec python.exe spawned by PSEXESVC.exe
Service Execution
(T1035)
Tactic (Alert, Correlated)
A Tactic alert detection (red icon) called "ATT&CK: Execution" was generated due to PSEXESVC.exe attempting to execute a malicious file. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1] [2]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed python.exe spawned by PSEXESVC.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious PowerShell. [1]
9.A.1
Dropped rar.exe to disk on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4)  python.exe creating the file rar.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a create file event for python.exe creating rar.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
9.A.2
Dropped sdelete.exe to disk on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4)  python.exe creating the file sdelete64.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a create file event for python.exe creating sdelete64.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
9.B.1
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe​ spawning from python.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed python.exe executing powershell.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
9.B.2
Searched filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem​
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
General (Configuration Change (Detections), Correlated, Alert)
A General alert detection was generated for powershell.exe executing Get-ChildItem​. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. A sensor policy update that enables deeper PowerShell visibility was re-applied. [1]
9.B.3
Scripted search of filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem​
Automated Collection
(T1119)
General (Configuration Change (Detections), Correlated, Alert)
A General alert detection for "malicious command" was generated on powershell.exe executing Get-ChildItem. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. A sensor policy update that enables deeper PowerShell visibility was re-applied. [1]
9.B.4
Recursively collected files found in C:\Users\Pam\ using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\Pam\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
Telemetry (Configuration Change (Detections), Correlated)
Telemetry showed file opens of C:\Users\Pam\*. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. A sensor policy update that enables file read event collection was re-applied. [1] [2]
9.B.5
Staged files for exfiltration into ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file working.zip
Data Staged
(T1074)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a Create File event for powershell.exe creating working.zip. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
9.B.6
Encrypted staged ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) into working.zip (on Desktop) using rar.exe powershell.exe executing rar.exe with the -a parameter for a password to use for encryption
Data Encrypted
(T1022)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing rar.exe with command-line arguments. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
9.B.7
Compressed staged ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) into working.zip (on Desktop) using rar.exe powershell.exe executing rar.exe
Data Compressed
(T1002)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing rar.exe with command-line arguments. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
9.B.8
Read and downloaded ZIP (working.zip on Desktop) over C2 channel (192.168.0.5 over TCP port 8443) python.exe reading the file working.zip while connected to the C2 channel
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
(T1041)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed python.exe reading working.zip and an existing C2 channel (192.168.0.4 over port 8443). The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
9.C.1
Deleted rar.exe on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file rar.exe
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete rar.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
9.C.2
Deleted working.zip (from Desktop) on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file \Desktop\working.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete Desktop\working.zip. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
9.C.3
Deleted working.zip (from AppData directory) on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file \AppData\Roaming\working.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete Roaming\working.zip. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
9.C.4
Deleted SDelete on disk using cmd.exe del command cmd.exe deleting the file sdelete64.exe
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed cmd.exe deleting sdelete64.exe and file deletion event. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for psexec.exe executing a malicious file. [1]
10.A.1
Executed persistent service (javamtsup) on system startup javamtsup.exe spawning from services.exe
Service Execution
(T1035)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
10.B.1
Executed LNK payload (hostui.lnk) in Startup Folder on user login Evidence that the file hostui.lnk (which executes hostui.bat as a byproduct) was executed from the Startup Folder
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder" occurred containing evidence of hostui.lnk executing from Startup Folder. [1]
10.B.2
Executed PowerShell payload via the CreateProcessWithToken API hostui.exe executing the CreateProcessWithToken API
Execution through API
(T1106)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed svchost.exe with -seclogon flag spawning before PowerShell. [1]
10.B.3
Manipulated the token of the PowerShell payload via the CreateProcessWithToken API hostui.exe manipulating the token of powershell.exe via the CreateProcessWithToken API OR powershell.exe executing with the stolen token of explorer.exe
Access Token Manipulation
(T1134)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red indicator) called was generated for a mismatch between the parent and creator process on PowerShell. [1]
11.A.1
User Oscar executed payload 37486-the-shocking-truth-about-election-rigging-in-america.rtf.lnk powershell.exe spawning from explorer.exe
User Execution
(T1204)
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (red indicator) was generated for malicious use of powershell.exe. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed explorer.exe spawning powershell.exe.
11.A.2
Executed an alternate data stream (ADS) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing the schemas ADS via Get-Content and IEX
NTFS File Attributes
(T1096)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the schemas ADS with Get-Content and IEX. [1] [2]
11.A.3
Checked that the BIOS version and serial number are not associated with VirtualBox or VMware using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_BIOS
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
(T1497)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.4
Enumerated computer manufacturer, model, and version information using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject gwmi queries for Win32_BIOS and Win32_ComputerSystem
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.5
Enumerated devices/adapters to check for presence of VirtualBox driver(s) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_PnPEntity
Peripheral Device Discovery
(T1120)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.6
Checked that the username is not related to admin or a generic value (ex: user) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_ComputerSystem
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.7
Checked that the computer is joined to a domain using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_ComputerSystem
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.8
Checked that processes such as procexp.exe, taskmgr.exe, or wireshark.exe are not running using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Win32 process executing...attempting to retrieve users" occurred containing evidence of the PowerShell gwmi query for Win32_Process. [1]
11.A.9
Checked that the payload is not inside a folder path that contains "sample" or is the length of a hash value using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (Get-Item -Path ".\" -Verbose).FullName
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.10
Decoded an embedded DLL payload to disk using certutil.exe certutil.exe decoding kxwn.lock
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red indicator) for "Certutil.exe used to decode data" was generated for certutil decoding the payload with command-line arguments. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the certutil.exe process and corresponding file write of the kxwn.lock payload. [1]
11.A.11
Established Registry Run key persistence using PowerShell Addition of the Webcache subkey in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red indicator) called "Registry key modification (ATT&CK Persistence)" was generated when the Webcache subkey was added to the Registry Run key. [1] [2]
11.A.12
Executed PowerShell stager payload powershell.exe spawning from from the schemas ADS (powershell.exe)
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red; unique symbol) called "ATT&CK Execution: PowerShell" was generated due to powershell.exe spawned from a PowerShell stager. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe spawned from a PowerShell stager. [1]
11.A.13
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.4) via PowerShell payload over port 443 Established network channel over port 443
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe making a network connection to the C2 (192.168.0.4) over port 443. [1]
11.A.14
Used HTTPS to transport C2 (192.168.0.4) traffic Established network channel over the HTTPS protocol
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed the loading of cryptographic libraries. Although telemetry showed a network connection over port 443 no protocol was identified for this traffic, so detection does not apply.
11.A.15
Used HTTPS to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.4) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed the loading of cryptographic libraries. Although telemetry showed a network connection over port 443 no protocol was identified for this traffic, so detection does not apply.
12.A.1
Enumerated the System32 directory using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (gci ((gci env:windir).Value + '\system32')
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
12.A.2
Modified the time attributes of the kxwn.lock persistence payload using PowerShell powershell.exe modifying the creation, last access, and last write times of kxwn.lock
Timestomp
(T1099)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. However, manually viewing kxwn.lock on the impacted host showed that it had been modified, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
12.B.1
Enumerated registered AV products using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for AntiVirusProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
12.C.1
Enumerated installed software via the Registry (Wow6432 Uninstall key) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Registry query for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
Query Registry
(T1012)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
12.C.2
Enumerated installed software via the Registry (Uninstall key) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Registry query for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
Query Registry
(T1012)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
13.A.1
Enumerated the computer name using the GetComputerNameEx API powershell.exe executing the GetComputerNameEx API
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
General (Configuration Change (Detections), Alert, Correlated)
A General alert detection was generated for GetComputerNameEx being executed by powershell.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. For the Configuration Change, the PowerShell detection policy was disabled. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "System Information Discovery" occurred containing evidence of the GetComputerNameEx API call. [1]
13.B.1
Enumerated the domain name using the NetWkstaGetInfo API powershell.exe executing the NetWkstaGetInfo API
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell calling the NetWkstaGetInfo API. [1]
13.C.1
Enumerated the current username using the GetUserNameEx API powershell.exe executing the GetUserNameEx API
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for a PowerShell process occurred containing evidence of the GetUserNameEx API call. [1]
13.D.1
Enumerated running processes using the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API powershell.exe executing the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API
Process Discovery
(T1057)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for a PowerShell process occurred containing evidence of the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API call. [1]
14.A.1
Modified the Registry to enable COM hijacking of sdclt.exe using PowerShell Addition of the DelegateExecute subkey in HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command
Component Object Model Hijacking
(T1122)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
14.A.2
Executed elevated PowerShell payload High integrity powrshell.exe spawning from control.exe​​ (spawned from sdclt.exe)
Bypass User Account Control
(T1088)
General (Correlated, Alert)
A General alert detection (red; unique symbol) was generated for "malicious use of powershell.exe" that showed a new High Integrity PowerShell callback spawned from control.exe (spawned from sdclt.exe). [1] [2] [3]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a new High Integrity PowerShell callback spawned from control.exe (spawned from sdclt.exe). The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. [1]
14.A.3
Modified the Registry to remove artifacts of COM hijacking using PowerShell Deletion of the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\Open\command subkey
Modify Registry
(T1112)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
14.B.1
Created and executed a WMI class using PowerShell WMI Process (WmiPrvSE.exe) executing powershell.exe
Windows Management Instrumentation
(T1047)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed WmiPrvSE.exe executing powershell.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. [1]
14.B.2
Enumerated and tracked PowerShell processes using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Process Discovery" occurred containing evidence of PowerShell Get-Process. [1] [2]
14.B.3
Downloaded and dropped Mimikatz (m.exe) to disk powershell.exe downloading and/or the file write of m.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
General (Alert, Correlated)
A General alert detection (unique symbol) was generated for using PowerShell to execute suspicious 'download' commands. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. [1]
14.B.4
Dumped plaintext credentials using Mimikatz (m.exe) m.exe injecting into lsass.exe to dump credentials
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection (red indicator) called "Credential Theft" was generated for command-line arguments indicative of Mimikatz credential dumping and accessing Lsass. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. [1] [2]
14.B.5
Encoded and wrote Mimikatz output to a WMI class property using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Set-WmiInstance
Obfuscated Files or Information
(T1027)
General (Configuration Change (Detections), Alert, Correlated)
A General alert detection was generated for Set-WmiInstance (by suspicious process). The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. A sensor policy update that enables deeper PowerShell visibility was re-applied. [1]
14.B.6
Read and decoded Mimikatz output from a WMI class property using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-WmiInstance
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information" occurred containing evidence of the PowerShell Get-WmiInstance reading encoded content from Win32_AuditCode. [1]
15.A.1
Enumerated logged on users using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:UserName
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
15.A.2
Established WMI event subscription persistence using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the WindowsParentalControlMigration WMI filter, consumer, and binding created in root/subscription
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
(T1084)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription" occurred containing evidence of WindowsParentalControlMigration WMI filter. [1]
16.A.1
Enumerated the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) using LDAP queries powershell.exe making LDAP queries over port 389 via functions from System.DirectoryServices.dll
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed powershell.exe making a network connection to the domain controller NewYork (10.0.0.4) over TCP port 389 and a modload for System.DirectoryServices.dll. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. [1]
16.B.1
Enumerated the domain SID (from current user SID) using the ConvertSidToStringSid API powershell.exe executing the ConvertSidToStringSid API
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for Account Discovery occurred containing evidence of the ConvertSidToStringSid API call. [1]
16.B.2
Executed the ConvertSidToStringSid API call by reflectively loading Advapi32.dll powershell.exe executing the ConvertSidToStringSid API function by loading Advapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed that PowerShell loaded Advapi32.dll. [1]
16.C.1
Established a WinRM connection to the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) Network connection to NewYork (10.0.0.4) over port 5985
Windows Remote Management
(T1028)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for Windows Remote Management occurred containing evidence of the connection to remote host NewYork (10.0.0.4) over port 5985. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed powershell.exe making a network connection to remote host NewYork (10.0.0.4) over port 5985. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. [1]
16.C.2
Logged on to the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) using valid credentials for user MScott  Successful logon as user MScott on NewYork (10.0.0.4)
Valid Accounts
(T1078)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for Valid Accounts occurred containing evidence of the Successful logon on NewYork as user MScott. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a successful logon on NewYork (10.0.0.4) as user MScott. [1] [2]
16.D.1
Dropped Mimikatz (m.exe) to disk on the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) over a WinRM connection File write of m.exe by the WinRM process (wsmprovhost.exe)
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed the file write of m.exe to the System32 directory by wsmprovhost.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. [1]
16.D.2
Dumped the KRBTGT hash on the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) using Mimikatz (m.exe) m.exe injecting into lsass.exe to dump credentials
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red, unique symbol) called Credential Theft was generated for m.exe with command-line arguments indicative of Mimikatz credential dumping. [1] [2]
17.A.1
Dumped messages from the local Outlook inbox using PowerShell outlook.exe spawning from svchost.exe or powershell.exe
Email Collection
(T1114)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection (red, unique symbol) called "PowerShell access to Outlook mailbox data (ATT&CK: Collection)" was generated due a process having access to Outlook mailbox data through use of a PowerShell script. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. [1] [2] [3]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed outlook.exe spawning from svchost.exe, which is indicative of programmatic access to Outlook emails. [1]
17.B.1
Read and collected a local file using PowerShell powershell.exe reading the file MITRE-ATTACK-EVALS.HTML
Data from Local System
(T1005)
Telemetry (Configuration Change (Detections), Correlated)
Telemetry showed PowerShell opening MITRE-ATTACK-EVALS.HTML. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for malicious use of PowerShell. A sensor policy update that enables file read event collection was re-applied. [1] [2]
17.B.2
Staged collected file into directory using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file \WindowsParentalControlMigration\MITRE-ATTACK-EVALS.HTML
Data Staged
(T1074)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed the file create event for MITRE-ATTACK-EVALS.HTML. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. [1]
17.C.1
Compressed a staging directory using PowerShell powershell.exe executing the ZipFile.CreateFromDirectory .NET method
Data Compressed
(T1002)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for Data Compressed occurred containing evidence of PowerShell compressing collection via ZipFile.CreateFromDirectory .NET method. [1]
17.C.2
Prepended the GIF file header to a compressed staging file using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Set-Content
Obfuscated Files or Information
(T1027)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Obfuscated Files or Information" occurred containing evidence of PowerShell appending the GIF file header to the compressed file. [1] [2]
18.A.1
Mapped a network drive to an online OneDrive account using PowerShell net.exe with command-line arguments then making a network connection to a public IP over port 443
Web Service
(T1102)
General (Alert, Correlated)
A General alert detection (red indicator) was generated due to net.exe conducting suspicious activity and connecting to a well known port. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. [1] [2]
18.A.2
Exfiltrated staged collection to an online OneDrive account using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Copy-Item pointing to drive mapped to an attack-controlled OneDrive account
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
(T1048)
General (Configuration Change (Detections), Alert, Correlated)
A General alert detection (unique symbol) was generated for PowerShell executing a malicious command. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for the malicious use of powershell.exe. A sensor policy update that enables deeper PowerShell visibility was re-applied. [1] [2]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol occurred containing evidence of PowerShell using Copy-Item to the Y drive. [1]