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Kaspersky: All Results Tactic Page Information

The ATT&CK All Results page displays the procedures, tested techniques, and detection results for all steps in an evaluation. The Procedure column contains a description of how the technique in the corresponding technique column was tested. The Step column is where in the operational flow the procedure occurred. Click the Step Number to view it in the Operational Flow panel. Detections are classified by one or more Detection Types, summarized by the Detection Notes, and may be supported by Screenshots. The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

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Overview Matrix JSON Legend
Legend
Main Detection Categories: Detection Modifiers:

None

Telemetry

Indicator of
Compromise

General
Behavior

MSSP

General

Tactic

Specific
Behavior

Technique

Enrichment

Tainted

Alert

Correlated

Delayed

Host
Interrogation

Residual
Artifact

Configuration
Change

Innovative
Step
Procedures Criteria
Technique
Detection Type Detection Notes
1.A.1
User Pam executed payload rcs.3aka3.doc The rcs.3aka3.doc process spawning from explorer.exe
User Execution
(T1204)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow; medium severity) called "User Execution" was generated due to execution of rcs.3aka3.doc file by explorer.exe. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of "User Execution" due to execution of rcs.3aka3.doc by explorer.exe. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed explorer.exe executing rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
1.A.2
Used unicode right-to-left override (RTLO) character to obfuscate file name rcs.3aka3.doc (originally cod.3aka.scr) Evidence of the right-to-left override character (U+202E) in the rcs.3aka.doc process ​OR the original filename (cod.3aka.scr)
Masquerading
(T1036)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow; medium severity) called Masquerading was generated due to altered file name by the RTLO character. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of "Defense Evasion" contained evidence of RTLO character in rcs.3aka.doc. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the original filename​ cod.3aka.scr as well as the RTLO ASCII characters. [1]
1.A.3
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.5) via rcs.3aka3.doc payload over TCP port 1234 Established network channel over port 1234
Uncommonly Used Port
(T1065)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the rcs.3aka3.doc process connecting to 192.168.0.5 on TCP port 1234. [1]
1.A.4
Used RC4 stream cipher to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
1.B.1
Spawned interactive cmd.exe cmd.exe spawning from the rcs.3aka3.doc​ process
Command-Line Interface
(T1059)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow; medium severity) called "Command Line Interface" was generated due to cmd.exe spawning from rcs.3aka3.doc​. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of rcs.3aka3.doc​ spawning cmd.exe [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed rcs.3aka3.doc spawning from cmd.exe. [1]
1.B.2
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe spawning from cmd.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection (yellow; medium severity) called PowerShell was generated due to the execution of powershell.exe by cmd.exe. The alert was correlated to a parent alert for command line execution. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of cmd.exe spawning powershell.exe. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe spawning from cmd.exe. [1]
2.A.1
Searched filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
2.A.2
Scripted search of filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem
Automated Collection
(T1119)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
2.A.3
Recursively collected files found in C:\Users\Pam\ using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\Pam\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
2.A.4
Compressed and stored files into ZIP (Draft.zip) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Compress-Archive
Data Compressed
(T1002)
Technique (Alert, Configuration Change (Detections))
A Technique alert detection (green indicator; low severity) called Data Compressed was generated due to the creation of Draft.Zip by powershell.exe. Additional PowerShell logging was enabled after the start of the evaluation so the detection is identified as a Detection Configuration Change. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of draft.zip being created and compressed by PowerShell. [1]
2.A.5
Staged files for exfiltration into ZIP (Draft.zip) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file draft.zip
Data Staged
(T1074)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of the creation of Draft.Zip by powershell.exe. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed the creation of Draft.Zip. The event was correlated to a parent Technique detection for a suspicious PowerShell process. [1]
2.B.1
Read and downloaded ZIP (Draft.zip) over C2 channel (192.168.0.5 over TCP port 1234) The rcs.3aka3.doc process reading the file draft.zip while connected to the C2 channel
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
(T1041)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
3.A.1
Dropped stage 2 payload (monkey.png) to disk The rcs.3aka3.doc process creating the file monkey.png
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed rcs.3aka3.doc creating monkey.png. The event was correlated to a parent detection for masquerading. [1]
3.A.2
Embedded PowerShell payload in monkey.png using steganography Evidence that a PowerShell payload was within monkey.png
Obfuscated Files or Information
(T1027)
Technique (Correlated, Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red; high severity) for suspicious command-line obfuscation was generated for PowerShell extracting and executing the code embedded within monkey.png. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for suspicious PowerShell. [1] [2] [3]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of a PowerShell script in monkey.png. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell extracting and executing the code embedded within monkey.png. [1]
3.B.1
Modified the Registry to enable COM hijacking of sdclt.exe using PowerShell Addition of the DelegateExecute ​subkey in ​HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\​​command​​
Component Object Model Hijacking
(T1122)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of the addition of DelegateExecute value in the Registry. [1]
3.B.2
Executed elevated PowerShell payload High integrity powershell.exe spawning from control.exe​​ (spawned from sdclt.exe)
Bypass User Account Control
(T1088)
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (red; high severity) for "Suspicious PowerShell" was generated due to execution of powershell.exe by control.exe. [1] [2]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for "Possible UAC Bypass" contained evidence of a new highiIntegrity PowerShell callback spawning from control.exe. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell spawning from control.exe​​. [1]
3.B.3
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.5) via PowerShell payload over TCP port 443 Established network channel over port 443
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red; high severity) called "Commonly Used Port" was generated due to powershell.exe connecting to 192.168.0.5 on TCP 443. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe connecting to 192.168.0.5 on port 443. [1]
3.B.4
Used HTTPS to transport C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is HTTPS
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. Although telemetry showed a network connection over port 443 no protocol was identified for this traffic, so a detection does not apply.
3.B.5
Used HTTPS to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. Although telemetry showed a network connection over port 443 no protocol was identified for this traffic, so a detection does not apply.
3.C.1
Modified the Registry to remove artifacts of COM hijacking Deletion of of the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\Open\command subkey
Modify Registry
(T1112)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.A.1
Dropped additional tools (SysinternalsSuite.zip) to disk over C2 channel (192.168.0.5) powershell.exe creating the file SysinternalsSuite.zip
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of the file write of the ZIP by PowerShell. [1] [2]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed the file write of the ZIP by PowerShell. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for suspicious PowerShell. [1]
4.A.2
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe spawning from powershell.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection (yellow; medium severity) called "PowerShell" was generated due to powershell.exe spawning a new powershell.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for suspicious PowerShell. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of powershell.exe spawning from powershell.exe and indicated the new PowerShell process was a meterpreter shell. [1] [2]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a new powershell.exe spawning from powershell.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for suspicious PowerShell. [1]
4.A.3
Decompressed ZIP (SysinternalsSuite.zip) file using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Expand-Archive
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of powershell.exe decompressing SysinternalsSuite.zip via Expand-Archive. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell writing the files that were decompressed from the ZIP. [1] [2]
4.B.1
Enumerated current running processes using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.B.2
Deleted rcs.3aka3.doc on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file rcs.3aka3.doc
File Deletion
(T1107)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of sdelete64.exe deleting rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete.exe running with command-line arguments to delete the file. [1]
4.B.3
Deleted Draft.zip on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file draft.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of sdelete64.exe deleting Draft.Zip. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete.exe running with command-line arguments to delete the file. [1]
4.B.4
Deleted SysinternalsSuite.zip on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file SysinternalsSuite.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of sdelete64.exe deleting SysinternalsSuite.zip. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete.exe running with command-line arguments to delete the file. [1]
4.C.1
Enumerated user's temporary directory path using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:TEMP
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.2
Enumerated the current username using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:USERNAME
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.3
Enumerated the computer hostname using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:COMPUTERNAME
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.4
Enumerated the current domain name using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:USERDOMAIN
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.5
Enumerated the current process ID using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $PID
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.6
Enumerated the OS version using PowerShell powershell.exe executing​ Gwmi Win32_OperatingSystem
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.7
Enumerated anti-virus software using PowerShell powershell.exe executing​ Get-WmiObject ...​ -Class AntiVirusProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.8
Enumerated firewall software using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-WmiObject ...​​ -Class FireWallProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.9
Enumerated user's domain group membership via the NetUserGetGroups API powershell.exe executing the NetUserGetGroups API
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.10
Executed API call by reflectively loading Netapi32.dll The NetUserGetGroups API function loaded into powershell.exe from Netapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.11
Enumerated user's local group membership via the NetUserGetLocalGroups API powershell.exe executing the NetUserGetLocalGroups API
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.12
Executed API call by reflectively loading Netapi32.dll The NetUserGetLocalGroups API function loaded into powershelle.exe from Netapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
5.A.1
Created a new service (javamtsup) that executes a service binary (javamtsup.exe) at system startup powershell.exe creating the Javamtsup service
New Service
(T1050)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of the creation of the javamtsup service. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a registry event for the creation of javamtsup service. The event was correlated to a parent General detection for suspicious PowerShell. [1] [2]
5.B.1
Created a LNK file (hostui.lnk) in the Startup folder that executes on login powershell.exe creating the file hostui.lnk in the Startup folder
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of the creation of hostui.lnk. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed powershell.exe creating the hostui.lnk file in the Startup folder. The event was correlated to a parent General detection for suspicious PowerShell. [1] [2]
6.A.1
Read the Chrome SQL database file to extract encrypted credentials accesschk.exe reading files within %APPDATALOCAL%\Google\chrome\user data\default\
Credentials in Files
(T1081)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
6.A.2
Executed the CryptUnprotectedData API call to decrypt Chrome passwords accesschk.exe executing the CryptUnprotectedData API
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
6.A.3
Masqueraded a Chrome password dump tool as accesscheck.exe, a legitimate Sysinternals tool Evidence that accesschk.exe is not the legitimate Sysinternals tool
Masquerading
(T1036)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence showing accesschk.exe is not the legitimate Sysinternals tool. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed hash of accesschk.exe which can be used to verify it is not the legitimate Sysinternals tool. [1]
6.B.1
Exported a local certificate to a PFX file using PowerShell powershell.exe creating a certificate file exported from the system
Private Keys
(T1145)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed file create event for a $RandomFileName.pfx file by powershell.exe. The event was correlated to a parent General detection for suspicious PowerShell. [1]
6.C.1
Dumped password hashes from the Windows Registry by injecting a malicious DLL into Lsass.exe powershell.exe injecting into lsass.exe OR lsass.exe reading Registry keys under HKLM:\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. Unable to test because execution blocked by the vendor solution.
7.A.1
Captured and saved screenshots using PowerShell powershell.exe executing the CopyFromScreen function from System.Drawing.dll
Screen Capture
(T1113)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of PowerShell loading .Net assemblies to capture screenshots. [1]
7.A.2
Captured clipboard contents using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Clipboard
Clipboard Data
(T1115)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
7.A.3
Captured user keystrokes using the GetAsyncKeyState API powershell.exe executing the GetAsyncKeyState API
Input Capture
(T1056)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of PowerShell loading .NET assemblies to capture key strokes. [1]
7.B.1
Read data in the user's Downloads directory using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\pam\Downloads\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
7.B.2
Compressed data from the user's Downloads directory into a ZIP file (OfficeSupplies.7z) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file OfficeSupplies.7z
Data Compressed
(T1002)
MSSP
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of the file create of OfficeSupplies.7z. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed the file write event for OfficeSupplies.7z. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for suspicious PowerShell. [1]
7.B.3
Encrypted data from the user's Downloads directory using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Compress-7Zip with the password argument used for encryption
Data Encrypted
(T1022)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
7.B.4
Exfiltrated collection (OfficeSupplies.7z) to WebDAV network share using PowerShell powershell executing Copy-Item pointing to an attack-controlled WebDav network share (192.168.0.4:80)
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
(T1048)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of OfficeSupplies.7z being uploaded to 192.168.0.4 using WebDav. [1]
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
8.A.1
Enumerated remote systems using LDAP queries powershell.exe making LDAP queries over port 389 to the Domain Controller (10.0.0.4)
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe establishing a connection to NewYork (10.0.0.4) over port 389. [1]
8.A.2
Established WinRM connection to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) Network connection to Scranton (10.0.1.4) over port 5985
Windows Remote Management
(T1028)
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (red; high severity) was generated for "PowerShell with network activity". [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a connection to Scranton (10.0.1.4) over port 5985. [1] [2]
8.A.3
Enumerated processes on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
8.B.1
Copied python.exe payload from a WebDAV share (192.168.0.4) to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) The file python.exe created on Scranton (10.0.1.4)
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of remote file copy of python.exe to Scranton (10.0.1.4). [1]
8.B.2
python.exe payload was packed with UPX Evidence that the file python.exe is packed
Software Packing
(T1045)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
8.C.1
Logged on to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) using valid credentials for user Pam Successful logon as user Pam on Scranton (10.0.1.4)
Valid Accounts
(T1078)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of a valid logon on Scranton (10.0.1.4) as user Pam. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a valid logon on Scranton (10.0.1.4) as user Pam. [1] [2]
8.C.2
Established SMB session to remote host Scranton's (10.0.1.4) IPC$ share using PsExec SMB session to Scanton (10.0.1.4) over TCP port 445/135 OR evidence of usage of a Windows share
Windows Admin Shares
(T1077)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of psexec64 establishing an IPC share on Scranton (10.0.1.4). [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed an SMB session from Nashua (10.0.1.6) to Scranton (10.0.1.4) over TCP port 135. [1]
8.C.3
Executed python.exe using PSExec python.exe spawned by PSEXESVC.exe
Service Execution
(T1035)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of the execution of psexecsvc.exe. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PSEXESVC.exe with command-line arguments to execute python.exe. [1]
9.A.1
Dropped rar.exe to disk on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4)  python.exe creating the file rar.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of the creation of rar.exe. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a file create event for python.exe creating rar.exe. [1]
9.A.2
Dropped sdelete.exe to disk on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4)  python.exe creating the file sdelete64.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of the creation of sdelete64.exe. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a file create event for python.exe creating sdelete64.exe. [1]
9.B.1
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe​ spawning from python.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow; medium severity) called "T1086_PowerShell" was generated due to python.exe spawning powershell.exe. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of python spawning powershell.exe. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed python.exe executing powershell.exe. [1]
9.B.2
Searched filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem​
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
9.B.3
Scripted search of filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem​
Automated Collection
(T1119)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
9.B.4
Recursively collected files found in C:\Users\Pam\ using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\Pam\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
9.B.5
Staged files for exfiltration into ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file working.zip
Data Staged
(T1074)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of the creation of working.zip. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a file create event for powershell.exe creating working.zip. [1]
9.B.6
Encrypted staged ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) into working.zip (on Desktop) using rar.exe powershell.exe executing rar.exe with the -a parameter for a password to use for encryption
Data Encrypted
(T1022)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection (green; low severity) called Data Encrypted was generated due to powershell.exe executing rar.exe with command-line arguments to encrypt working.zip. The event was correlated to a parent Technique detection on powershell.exe. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of execution of rar.exe with command line arguments to encrypt working.zip. [1]
9.B.7
Compressed staged ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) into working.zip (on Desktop) using rar.exe powershell.exe executing rar.exe
Data Compressed
(T1002)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (green; low severity) called "T1002_Data_Compressed" was generated due to powershell.exe executing rar.exe with command-line arguments indicative of compression. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of execution of rar.exe with command line arguments to compress working.zip. [1]
9.B.8
Read and downloaded ZIP (working.zip on Desktop) over C2 channel (192.168.0.5 over TCP port 8443) python.exe reading the file working.zip while connected to the C2 channel
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
(T1041)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
9.C.1
Deleted rar.exe on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file rar.exe
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete rar.exe. [1]
9.C.2
Deleted working.zip (from Desktop) on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file \Desktop\working.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete Desktop\working.zip. [1]
9.C.3
Deleted working.zip (from AppData directory) on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file \AppData\Roaming\working.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete Roaming\working.zip. [1]
9.C.4
Deleted SDelete on disk using cmd.exe del command cmd.exe deleting the file sdelete64.exe
File Deletion
(T1107)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
10.A.1
Executed persistent service (javamtsup) on system startup javamtsup.exe spawning from services.exe
Service Execution
(T1035)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of javamtsup.exe spawning from services.exe. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed javamtsup.exe with parent process services.exe. [1]
10.B.1
Executed LNK payload (hostui.lnk) in Startup Folder on user login Evidence that the file hostui.lnk (which executes hostui.bat as a byproduct) was executed from the Startup Folder
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though execution of hostui.bat was observed.
10.B.2
Executed PowerShell payload via the CreateProcessWithToken API hostui.exe executing the CreateProcessWithToken API
Execution through API
(T1106)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
10.B.3
Manipulated the token of the PowerShell payload via the CreateProcessWithToken API hostui.exe manipulating the token of powershell.exe via the CreateProcessWithToken API OR powershell.exe executing with the stolen token of explorer.exe
Access Token Manipulation
(T1134)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.1
User Oscar executed payload 37486-the-shocking-truth-about-election-rigging-in-america.rtf.lnk powershell.exe spawning from explorer.exe
User Execution
(T1204)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow tag) called "User Execution" was generated due to the execution of powershell.exe from explorer.exe. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed explorer.exe spawning powershell.exe. [1]
11.A.2
Executed an alternate data stream (ADS) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing the schemas ADS via Get-Content and IEX
NTFS File Attributes
(T1096)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow; medium severity) called NTFS File Attributes was generated due to execution of schemas ADS by powershell.exe. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of PowerShell executing schemas ADS via Get-Content and IEX. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the schemas ADS with Get-Content and IEX. [1]
11.A.3
Checked that the BIOS version and serial number are not associated with VirtualBox or VMware using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_BIOS
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
(T1497)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of execution of an WMI query for Win32_BIOS. [1]
11.A.4
Enumerated computer manufacturer, model, and version information using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject gwmi queries for Win32_BIOS and Win32_ComputerSystem
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of execution of WMI queries for Win32_BIOS and Win32_ComputerSystem. [1]
11.A.5
Enumerated devices/adapters to check for presence of VirtualBox driver(s) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_PnPEntity
Peripheral Device Discovery
(T1120)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence for the execution of an WMI query for Win32_PnPEntity. [1] [2]
11.A.6
Checked that the username is not related to admin or a generic value (ex: user) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_ComputerSystem
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of execution of an WMI query for Win32_ComputerSystem. [1]
11.A.7
Checked that the computer is joined to a domain using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_ComputerSystem
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of execution of an WMI query for Win32_ComputerSystem. [1]
11.A.8
Checked that processes such as procexp.exe, taskmgr.exe, or wireshark.exe are not running using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of execution of an WMI query for Win32_Process. [1]
11.A.9
Checked that the payload is not inside a folder path that contains "sample" or is the length of a hash value using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (Get-Item -Path ".\" -Verbose).FullName
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.10
Decoded an embedded DLL payload to disk using certutil.exe certutil.exe decoding kxwn.lock
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow; medium severity) called "suspicious_certutil_usage_decoding" was generated due to certutil.exe decoding kxwn.lock. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of certutil.exe decoding the kxwn.lock payload. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the certutil.exe process and corresponding file write of the kxwn.lock payload. [1]
11.A.11
Established Registry Run key persistence using PowerShell Addition of the Webcache subkey in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow tag) called Registy Run Keys Startup Folder was generated due to powershell.exe adding the Webcache subkey Run key persistence into the Registry. [1] [2]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of the Webcache subkey added to the Registry to establish persistence. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe adding Run key persistence into the Registry. [1] [2]
11.A.12
Executed PowerShell stager payload powershell.exe spawning from from the schemas ADS (powershell.exe)
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) for "PowerShell" was generated for powershell.exe spawned from a PowerShell stager. [1] [2]
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (high severity) called "PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic" was generated for a potential threat. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of PowerShell executing from schemas ADS. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe spawned from a PowerShell stager. [1] [2]
11.A.13
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.4) via PowerShell payload over port 443 Established network channel over port 443
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red indicator) called Commonly Used Port was generated for powershell.exe making a network connection to the C2 (192.168.0.4) over port 443. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of PowerShell establishing C2 with 192.168.0.4 over TCP port 443. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe making a network connection to the C2 (192.168.0.4) over port 443. [1]
11.A.14
Used HTTPS to transport C2 (192.168.0.4) traffic Established network channel over the HTTPS protocol
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1] [2]
11.A.15
Used HTTPS to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.4) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
12.A.1
Enumerated the System32 directory using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (gci ((gci env:windir).Value + '\system32')
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
12.A.2
Modified the time attributes of the kxwn.lock persistence payload using PowerShell powershell.exe modifying the creation, last access, and last write times of kxwn.lock
Timestomp
(T1099)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of timestomping of kxwn.lock. [1]
12.B.1
Enumerated registered AV products using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for AntiVirusProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of a PowerShell gwmi query for AntiVirusProduct. [1]
12.C.1
Enumerated installed software via the Registry (Wow6432 Uninstall key) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Registry query for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
Query Registry
(T1012)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
12.C.2
Enumerated installed software via the Registry (Uninstall key) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Registry query for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
Query Registry
(T1012)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
13.A.1
Enumerated the computer name using the GetComputerNameEx API powershell.exe executing the GetComputerNameEx API
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell executing the GetComputerNameEx API. [1]
13.B.1
Enumerated the domain name using the NetWkstaGetInfo API powershell.exe executing the NetWkstaGetInfo API
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of PowerShell executing the NetWKstaGetInfo API. [1]
13.C.1
Enumerated the current username using the GetUserNameEx API powershell.exe executing the GetUserNameEx API
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of PowerShell executing the GetUserNameEx API. [1]
13.D.1
Enumerated running processes using the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API powershell.exe executing the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API
Process Discovery
(T1057)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell executing the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API. [1] [2]
14.A.1
Modified the Registry to enable COM hijacking of sdclt.exe using PowerShell Addition of the DelegateExecute subkey in HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command
Component Object Model Hijacking
(T1122)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence for a well-known UAC bypass technique. [1]
14.A.2
Executed elevated PowerShell payload High integrity powrshell.exe spawning from control.exe​​ (spawned from sdclt.exe)
Bypass User Account Control
(T1088)
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (red; high severity) for "Suspicious PowerShell" was generated due to execution of powershell.exe by control.exe. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of High Integrity PowerShell process spawned from control.exe. [1]
14.A.3
Modified the Registry to remove artifacts of COM hijacking using PowerShell Deletion of the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\Open\command subkey
Modify Registry
(T1112)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
14.B.1
Created and executed a WMI class using PowerShell WMI Process (WmiPrvSE.exe) executing powershell.exe
Windows Management Instrumentation
(T1047)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red; high severity) called "commandline_wmi_event_consumer_triggered" was generated due to WmiPrvSE.exe executing powershell.exe. [1] [2]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of WmiPrvSE.exe executing powershell.exe to execute the Win32_AuditCode WMI class. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed WmiPrvSE.exe executing powershell.exe. [1]
14.B.2
Enumerated and tracked PowerShell processes using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of PowerShell collecting information about running processes. [1]
14.B.3
Downloaded and dropped Mimikatz (m.exe) to disk powershell.exe downloading and/or the file write of m.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the file create event for m.exe into the System32 folder. [1] [2]
14.B.4
Dumped plaintext credentials using Mimikatz (m.exe) m.exe injecting into lsass.exe to dump credentials
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red; high severity) called "mimikatz_command_patterns" was generated for m.exe executing with command-line arguments indicative of Mimikatz credential dumping. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of Mimikatz dumping credentials. [1]
14.B.5
Encoded and wrote Mimikatz output to a WMI class property using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Set-WmiInstance
Obfuscated Files or Information
(T1027)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
14.B.6
Read and decoded Mimikatz output from a WMI class property using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-WmiInstance
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
15.A.1
Enumerated logged on users using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:UserName
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
15.A.2
Established WMI event subscription persistence using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the WindowsParentalControlMigration WMI filter, consumer, and binding created in root/subscription
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
(T1084)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of WMI persistence established for user Oscar. [1] [2]
16.A.1
Enumerated the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) using LDAP queries powershell.exe making LDAP queries over port 389 via functions from System.DirectoryServices.dll
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection contained evidence of System.DirectoryServices.ni.dll loaded into PowerShell, which can be used to execute LDAP queries. [1]
16.B.1
Enumerated the domain SID (from current user SID) using the ConvertSidToStringSid API powershell.exe executing the ConvertSidToStringSid API
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
16.B.2
Executed the ConvertSidToStringSid API call by reflectively loading Advapi32.dll powershell.exe executing the ConvertSidToStringSid API function by loading Advapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
16.C.1
Established a WinRM connection to the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) Network connection to NewYork (10.0.0.4) over port 5985
Windows Remote Management
(T1028)
General (Alert)
A General detection alert (red; high severity) for PowerShell with network activity was generated for to powershell.exe making a network connection to remote host NewYork (10.0.0.4) over port 5985. [1]