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F-Secure: All Results Tactic Page Information

The ATT&CK All Results page displays the procedures, tested techniques, and detection results for all steps in an evaluation. The Procedure column contains a description of how the technique in the corresponding technique column was tested. The Step column is where in the operational flow the procedure occurred. Click the Step Number to view it in the Operational Flow panel. Detections are classified by one or more Detection Types, summarized by the Detection Notes, and may be supported by Screenshots. The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

MITRE does not assign scores, rankings, or ratings. The evaluation results are available to the public, so other organizations may provide their own analysis and interpretation - these are not endorsed or validated by MITRE.

Vendor Configuration         JSON     Legend
Legend
Main Detection Categories: Detection Modifiers:

None

Telemetry

Indicator of Compromise

General Behavior

Specific Behavior

Enrichment

Tainted

Delayed

Configuration Change
Step
Procedures
Technique
Detection Type Detection Notes
1.A.1
Legitimate user Debbie clicked and executed malicious self-extracting archive (Resume Viewer.exe) on 10.0.1.6 (Nimda)
User Execution
(T1204)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for the execution of a rare file (Resume Viewer.exe). [CC1] [CC4] The vendor reported that this behavior would have been prevented from executing. Screenshot is unavailable due to sensitivity of alert logic. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the execution of Resume Viewer.exe as a process. [1]
Previously executed batch file (pdfhelper.cmd) launched a DLL payload (update.dat) using Rundll32
Rundll32
(T1085)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed rundll32.exe executing update.dat. [1]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for an unusual call to rundll32.exe. [CC4] Screenshot is unavailable due to sensitivity of alert logic. [1]
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe executing in a way typical for rundll32 injections. [CC4] Screenshot is unavailable due to sensitivity of alert logic. [1]
Previously executed self-extracting archive (Resume Viewer.exe) launched an embedded batch file (pdfhelper.cmd)
Scripting
(T1064)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running pdfhelper.cmd) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (Resume Viewer.exe). [CC4] Screenshot is unavailable due to sensitivity of alert logic. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed pdfhelper.cmd was executed by cmd.exe. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1.B.1
Previously executed batch file (pdfhelper.cmd) moved a separate batch file (autoupdate.bat) to the Startup folder
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing autoupdate.bat from within the Startup folder. [1] [2] [3]
1.C.1
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established using port 53
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1] [2] [3]
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established using DNS traffic to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a trace of DNS queries being made by rundll32.exe to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com (C2 domain). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established using both NetBIOS and base64 encoding
Data Encoding
(T1132)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a trace of encoded DNS queries being made by rundll32.exe to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com (C2 domain). [1]
2.A.1
Cobalt Strike: 'ipconfig -all' via cmd
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
Enrichment
The capability enriched ipconfig.exe with a tag identifying the command as enumeration. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing ipconfig) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running ipconfig) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
2.A.2
Cobalt Strike: 'arp -a' via cmd
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running arp) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (cmd.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
Enrichment
The capability enriched arp.exe indicating its usage can be a sign of reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
2.B.1
Cobalt Strike: 'echo' via cmd to enumerate specific environment variables
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing the echo command. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing the echo command) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running echo) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
2.C.1
Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
2.C.2
Cobalt Strike: 'tasklist -v' via cmd
Process Discovery
(T1057)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running tasklist) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (cmd.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing tasklist) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing tasklist.exe along with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
2.D.1
Cobalt Strike: 'sc query' via cmd
System Service Discovery
(T1007)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running sc) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing sc with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
2.D.2
Cobalt Strike: 'net start' via cmd
System Service Discovery
(T1007)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing the net) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
2.E.1
Cobalt Strike: 'systeminfo' via cmd
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running systeminfo) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Enrichment
The capability enriched systeminfo.exe indicating it could be used for reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
2.E.2
Cobalt Strike: 'net config workstation' via cmd
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
Enrichment
The capability enriched net.exe indicating it is commonly used for reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing the net) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
2.F.1
Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators' via cmd
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing net with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Enrichment
The capability enriched net.exe indicating it is commonly used for reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing the net) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
2.F.2
Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators -domain' via cmd
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing the net) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing net with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (cmd.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Enrichment
The capability enriched net.exe indicating it is commonly used for reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
2.F.3
Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Admins" -domain' via cmd
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
Enrichment
The capability enriched net.exe indicating it is commonly used for reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing net with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
2.G.1
Cobalt Strike: 'net user -domain' via cmd
Account Discovery
(T1087)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing the net) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Enrichment
The capability enriched net.exe with a tag identifying the command as enumeration. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
2.G.2
Cobalt Strike: 'net user george -domain' via cmd
Account Discovery
(T1087)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (cmd.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Enrichment
The capability enriched net.exe with a tag identifying the command as enumeration. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
2.H.1
Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to enumerate a specific Registry key
Query Registry
(T1012)
Enrichment
The capability enriched reg.exe indicating that a sensitive registry key was accessed, possibly as part of reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing the reg) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing reg with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running reg) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
3.A.1
Cobalt Strike: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication capability executed to elevate process integrity level
Bypass User Account Control
(T1088)
Enrichment
The capability enriched an unelevated svchost.exe spawning an elevated powershell.exe process with a tag indicating a possible UAC Bypass. [1] [2] [3]
Cobalt Strike: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication capability executed to modify current process token
Access Token Manipulation
(T1134)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed svchost.exe executed with the seclogon command-line argument and a subsequent logon event for user Debbie with an elevated token, indicating token manipulation. [1] [2] [3]
3.B.1
Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
3.C.1
Cobalt Strike: Built-in process injection capability executed to inject callback into cmd.exe
Process Injection
(T1055)
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for PowerShell opening a handle to a system process with access rights typical for a known PowerShell injection pattern, identified as a sign of code injection. [1] [2]
4.A.1
Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Controllers" -domain' via cmd
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing net with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Enrichment
The capability enriched net.exe indicating that it was run with commands commonly used for reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
4.A.2
Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Computers" -domain' via cmd
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing net with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Enrichment
The capability enriched net.exe indicating that it was run with commands commonly used for reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
4.B.1
Cobalt Strike: 'netsh advfirewall show allprofiles' via cmd
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing netsh.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
4.C.1
Cobalt Strike: 'netstat -ano' via cmd
System Network Connections Discovery
(T1049)
Enrichment
The capability enriched netstat.exe with a tag identifying the command as enumeration. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
5.A.1
Cobalt Strike: Built-in Mimikatz credential dump capability executed
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1]
Cobalt Strike: Credential dump capability involved process injection into lsass
Process Injection
(T1055)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1] [2]
5.A.2
Cobalt Strike: Built-in hash dump capability executed
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
Enrichment
The capability enriched svchost.exe injecting a thread into lsass.exe with a tag identifying credential dumping. [1]
Cobalt Strike: Hash dump capability involved process injection into lsass.exe
Process Injection
(T1055)
Enrichment
The capability enriched svchost.exe injecting a thread into lsass.exe with a tag identifying thread injection. [1] [2]
5.B.1
Cobalt Strike: Built-in token theft capability executed to change user context to George
Access Token Manipulation
(T1134)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a cmd.exe associated with user Debbie spawn a cmd.exe associated with user George, indicating user context change via token manipulation. [1] [2] [3]
6.A.1
Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to remotely enumerate a specific Registry key on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
Query Registry
(T1012)
Enrichment
The capability enriched reg.exe identifying that a sensitive Registry key was accessed which could be used for recon. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing reg with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
6.B.1
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to use port 80
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed network connections over port 80 to 192.168.0.4 (C2 server) initiated from rundll32.exe. [1] [2] [3]
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to use HTTP traffic to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a trace of HTTP connections being made by rundll32.exe to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com (C2 domain). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to split communications between both HTTP and DNS
Multiband Communication
(T1026)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed rundll32.exe making network connections over port 80 to 192.168.0.4 (C2 server) as well as earlier identified DNS queries, which could indicate multiband communication. [1] [2]
6.C.1
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to proxy RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5)
Remote Desktop Protocol
(T1076)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed rundll32.exe making network connections to 10.0.0.5 (Conficker) over port 3389. [1] [2] [3]
7.A.1
Added user Jesse to Conficker (10.0.0.5) through RDP connection
Create Account
(T1136)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the creation of the new user Jesse. [1]
Microsoft Management Console (Local Users and Groups snap-in) GUI utility used to add new user through RDP connection
Graphical User Interface
(T1061)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed mmc.exe, the Microsoft Management Console, executing the GUI-based lusrmgr.msc (Local Users and Groups snap-in). [1]
Microsoft Management Console (Local Users and Groups snap-in) GUI utility displayed user account information
Account Discovery
(T1087)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed execution of mmc.exe, the Microsoft Management Console, spawning the lusrmgr.msc (Local Users and Groups snap-in), which displays local account information. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
7.B.1
Cobalt Strike: Built-in upload capability executed to write a DLL payload (updater.dll) to disk on Nimda (10.0.1.6)
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Enrichment
The capability enriched the creation of updater.dll identifying that a command prompt modified an unknown DLL. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
7.C.1
Cobalt Strike: 'schtasks' via cmd to create scheduled task that executes a DLL payload (updater.dll)
Scheduled Task
(T1053)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe registering the "Resume Viewer Update Checker" scheduled task. [1] [2]
8.A.1
Cobalt Strike: 'dir -s -b "\\conficker\wormshare"' via cmd
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
Enrichment
The capability enriched cmd.exe executing the dir command indicating that the parameter was a directory listing of a network drive associated with potential reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running dir) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing dir) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
8.A.2
Cobalt Strike: 'tree "C:\Users\debbie"' via cmd
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe running tree) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (rundll32.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for rundll32.exe launching cmd.exe (executing tree) which was identified as extremely rare and suspicious. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Enrichment
The capability enriched cmd.exe executing the tree command with a tag identifying the command as enumeration. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
8.B.1
Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
8.C.1
Cobalt Strike: Built-in keylogging capability executed to capture keystrokes of user Debbie
Input Capture
(T1056)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1] [2]
Cobalt Strike: Keylogging capability included residual enumeration of application windows
Application Window Discovery
(T1010)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1]
8.D.1
Cobalt Strike: Built-in screen capture capability executed to capture screenshot of current window of user Debbie
Screen Capture
(T1113)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Cobalt Strike: Screen capture capability involved process injection into explorer.exe
Process Injection
(T1055)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1] [2]
9.A.1
Cobalt Strike: 'ls' (List) via Win32 APIs to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
9.B.1
Cobalt Strike: Built-in download capability executed to a collect file (Shockwave_rackb_diagram.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
Data from Network Shared Drive
(T1039)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1]
Cobalt Strike: Download capability exfiltrated data through existing C2 channel
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
(T1041)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
10.A.1
Batch file (autoupdate.bat) previously written to Startup folder executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (update.dat) using Rundll32
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for a batch file automatically being started from the Startup folder. [1] [2] [3]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing autoupdate.bat from the Startup folder. [1] [2] [3]
10.A.2
Scheduled task executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (updater.dll) using Rundll32
Scheduled Task
(T1053)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed rundll32.exe executing updater.dll. [1] [2]
10.B.1
RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5) authenticated using previously added user Jesse
Valid Accounts
(T1078)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a remote interactive logon event for the account Jesse logging on to Conficker (10.0.0.5) over port 3389. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
RDP connection made to Conficker (10.0.0.5) as part of execution of persistence mechanism
Remote Desktop Protocol
(T1076)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a remote interactive logon event for the account Jesse logging on to Conficker (10.0.0.5) over port 3389. [1] [2] [3]
11.A.1
Legitimate user Bob clicked and executed malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) on 10.0.1.5 (CodeRed)
Scripting
(T1064)
Enrichment
The capability enriched wscript.exe executing powershell.exe with a tag indicating that wscript executed code. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for PowerShell executing a long, encoded command. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed wscript.exe executing autoupdate.vbs and subsequently powershell.exe. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
11.B.1
Empire: C2 channel established using port 443
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a network connection over port 443 to www.freegoogleadsenseinfo.com (C2 domain). [1] [2] [3]
Empire: C2 channel established using HTTPS traffic to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe making a connection over port 443 to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com (C2 domain). [CC2] There was an alert for PowerShell downloading significant amount of data using HTTP(S), though this alert was based only on the port (443). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Empire: Encrypted C2 channel established using HTTPS
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for PowerShell downloading a significant amount of data using HTTP(S). [1]
12.A.1
Empire: 'route print' via PowerShell
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (route) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
Enrichment
The capability enriched route.exe indicating that it could be used to print the routing table as part of reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing route.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
12.A.2
Empire: 'ipconfig -all' via PowerShell
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (ipconfig) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed ipconfig.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
Enrichment
The capability identified powershell.exe executing ipconfig.exe with a tag identifying the command as enumeration. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
12.B.1
Empire: 'whoami -all -fo list' via PowerShell
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (whoami) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Enrichment
The capability enriched powershell.exe executing whoami.exe indicating a sign of reconnaissance before privilege escalation. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing whoami.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
12.C.1
Empire: 'qprocess *' via PowerShell
Process Discovery
(T1057)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershelll.exe executing qprocess.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (qprocess) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Enrichment
The capability enriched qprocess.exe as listing running processes and possibly a sign of reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
12.D.1
Empire: 'net start' via PowerShell
System Service Discovery
(T1007)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
12.E.1
Empire: Built-in WinEnum module executed to programmatically execute a series of enumeration techniques
Scripting
(T1064)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
12.E.1.1
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of user information
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of user information. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
12.E.1.2
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AD group memberships
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of AD group memberships. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
12.E.1.3
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of password policy information
Password Policy Discovery
(T1201)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of password policy information. [1]
12.E.1.4.1
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of recently opened files
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of recently opened files. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
12.E.1.4.2
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of interesting files
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of interesting files. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
12.E.1.5
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of clipboard contents
Clipboard Data
(T1115)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of clipboard contents. [1] [2]
Indicator of Compromise
An Indicator of Compromise alert was generated for PowerShell Empire accessing the clipboard. [1] [2]
12.E.1.6.1
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of system information. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
12.E.1.6.2
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of Windows update information
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of Windows update information. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
12.E.1.7
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information via a Registry query
Query Registry
(T1012)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of system information via a Registry query. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
12.E.1.8
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of services
System Service Discovery
(T1007)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of services. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
12.E.1.9.1
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of available shares
Network Share Discovery
(T1135)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of available shares. [1] [2]
12.E.1.9.2
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of mapped network drives
Network Share Discovery
(T1135)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of mapped network drives. [1] [2]
12.E.1.10.1
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AV solutions
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of AV solutions. [1] [2]
12.E.1.10.2
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of firewall rules
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of firewall rules. [1] [2]
12.E.1.11
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of network adapters
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of network adapters. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
Enrichment
The capability enriched powershell.exe making a WMI query with a tag identifying the command as WMI enumerating adapters. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
12.E.1.12
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of established network connections
System Network Connections Discovery
(T1049)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the full contents of the executed Invoke-WinEnum PowerShell function, which includes enumeration of established network connections. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
12.F.1
Empire: 'net group "Domain Admins" -domain' via PowerShell
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net.exe) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
12.F.2
Empire: 'net�localgroup�administrators' via PowerShell
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net1.exe) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
12.G.1
Empire: 'net user' via PowerShell
Account Discovery
(T1087)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net.exe) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
12.G.2
Empire: 'net user -domain' via PowerShell
Account Discovery
(T1087)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net.exe) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
13.A.1
Empire: 'net group "Domain Computers" -domain' via PowerShell
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
13.B.1
Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell
System Network Connections Discovery
(T1049)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
13.B.2
Empire: 'netstat -ano' via PowerShell
System Network Connections Discovery
(T1049)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (netstat) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing netstat.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
13.C.1
Empire:�'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key
Query Registry
(T1012)
Enrichment
The capability enriched reg.exe indicating that a sensitive registry key was accessed for potential reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing reg.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
14.A.1
Empire: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication module executed to launch new callback with elevated process integrity level
Bypass User Account Control
(T1088)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed an elevated PowerShell spawned under the context of user Bob from an unelevated parent process. [1] [2] [3]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for a possible PowerShell privilege escalation based on the elevation of a child process from a non-elevated parent. [1] [2] [3]
Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded and wrote a new Empire stager (wdbypass) to disk
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe making an HTTP GET request over port 8080 to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com (C2 domain) for the file wdbypass. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for PowerShell downloading a significant amount of data using HTTP(S). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded a new Empire stager (wdbypass) over HTTP
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe making an HTTP GET request over port 8080 to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com (C2 domain) for the file wdbypass. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded a new Empire stager (wdbypass) over port 8080
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe making an HTTP GET request over port 8080 to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com (C2 domain) for the file wdbypass. [1] [2] [3]
15.A.1
Empire: Built-in keylogging module executed to capture keystrokes of user Bob
Input Capture
(T1056)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the GetAsyncKeyState method, indicating keylogging. [1] [2]
Enrichment
The capability enriched powershell.exe with a tag indicating .NET keylogging. [1] [2]
Empire: Built-in keylogging module included residual enumeration of application windows
Application Window Discovery
(T1010)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the GetForegroundWindow method. [1]
15.B.1
Empire: 'get-content' via PowerShell to collect sensitive file (it_tasks.txt) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
Credentials in Files
(T1081)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the Get-Content cmdlet on IT_tasks.txt. [1]
16.A.1
Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to brute force password spraying authentication attempts to Morris (10.0.1.4) and Nimda (10.0.1.6) targeting credentials of users�Kmitnick, Bob, and Frieda
Brute Force
(T1110)
Enrichment
The capability enriched multiple occurrences of net.exe usage as indicative of brute forcing a remote system as well as the correct ATT&CK Technique ID (Brute Force). [CC3] Screenshot is not available due to sensitivity of rule logic. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed repeated logon attempts via net.exe with command-line arguments indicative of password spraying. [1] [2]
Empire: Brute force password spraying attempts targeted Windows admin shares on Morris (10.0.1.4) and Nimda (10.0.1.6)
Windows Admin Shares
(T1077)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Specific Behavior
Specific Behavior alerts were generated for net.exe connecting to a remote administrative share. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed repeated logon attempts targeting ADMIN$ via net.exe and command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
16.B.1
Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to successfully authenticate to Conficker (10.0.0.5) using credentials of user Kmitnick
Valid Accounts
(T1078)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a logon attempt via net.exe with command-line arguments to connect using the valid credentials of user Kmitnick. Telemetry also showed a logon event for user Kmitnick on Conficker (10.0.0.5). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Empire: Successful authentication targeted Windows admin share on Conficker (10.0.0.5)�
Windows Admin Shares
(T1077)
Specific Behavior
Specific Behavior alerts were generated for net.exe connecting to a remote administrative share. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed repeated logon attempts targeting ADMIN$ via net.exe and command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Empire: Successful authentication to Conficker (10.0.0.5) using credentials of user Kmitnick as a result of the brute force password spraying
Brute Force
(T1110)
Enrichment
The capability enriched multiple occurrences of net.exe usage as indicative of brute forcing a remote system as well as the correct ATT&CK Technique ID (Brute Force). [CC3] Screenshot is not available due to sensitivity of rule logic. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a logon attempt via net.exe with command-line arguments to connect using the valid credentials of user Kmitnick. [1] [2]
16.C.1
Empire: 'net use -delete' via PowerShell
Network Share Connection Removal
(T1126)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2]
16.D.1
Empire: Successful authentication targeted Windows admin shares on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
Windows Admin Shares
(T1077)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (net) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a logon attempt via net.exe with command-line arguments targeting C$ on 10.0.0.4 (Creeper) using valid credentials for user Kmitnick. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to successfully authenticate to Creeper (10.0.0.4) using credentials of user Kmitnick
Valid Accounts
(T1078)
Enrichment
The capability enriched the net.exe connection using valid credentials of Kmitnick with an alert for possible lateral movement. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a logon attempt via net.exe with command-line arguments targeting C$ on 10.0.0.4 (Creeper) using valid credentials for user Kmitnick. Telemetry also showed a logon event for user Kmitnick on Creeper (10.0.0.4). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
16.E.1
Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the file creation of autoupdate.vbs. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
16.F.1
Empire: Built-in runas module executed to launch malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) as user Kmitnick�
Command-Line Interface
(T1059)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (cmd.exe) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed cmd.exe executing autoupdate.vbs through wscript.exe, and the associated user context change between user Bob and user Kmitnick. [1] [2]
16.G.1
Empire: Built-in move capability executed to write malicious VBScript (update.vbs) to disk on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the file creation of update.vbs. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
16.H.1
Empire: 'sc query' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate services on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
System Service Discovery
(T1007)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (sc) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing sc.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
16.I.1
Empire: 'sc create' via PowerShell to remotely create a service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
New Service
(T1050)
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for sc.exe used with parameters typical for lateral movement. [1] [2] [3]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (sc) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sc.exe execution with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3]
Empire: 'sc description' via PowerShell to remotely disguise a service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
Masquerading
(T1036)
Telemetry
Telemetry within the process trees showed execution of sc.exe with command-line arguments to create the AdobeUpdater service with binPath pointed to cmd.exe with arguments to execute update.vbs and a suspicious service description, which could indicate masquerading. [1] [2] [3]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (sc) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3]
16.J.1
Empire: 'sc qc' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
System Service Discovery
(T1007)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (sc) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sc.exe execution with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
16.K.1
Empire: 'type' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific file (update.vbs) on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the type command with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
16.L.1
Empire: 'sc start' via PowerShell to remotely launch a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
Service Execution
(T1035)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sc.exe execution with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3]
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for sc.exe used with parameters typical for lateral movement. [1] [2] [3]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (sc) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3]
17.A.1
Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key associated with terminal services
System Service Discovery
(T1007)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed reg.exe with command-line arguments to check if terminal services were enabled. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key
Query Registry
(T1012)
Enrichment
The capability enriched reg.exe indicating that a sensitive registry key was accessed for potential reconnaissance. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (reg) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed reg.exe with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
17.B.1
Empire: 'takeown' via PowerShell to obtain ownership of magnify.exe
File and Directory Permissions Modification
(T1222)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (takeown) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for takeown.exe changing the ownership of an accessibility feature executable. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed takeown.exe executing with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
17.B.2
Empire: 'icacls' via PowerShell to modify the DACL for magnify.exe
File and Directory Permissions Modification
(T1222)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (icacls) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed icacls.exe executing with command-line arguments. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for icalcs.exe changing the permissions of an accessibility feature executable. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
17.C.1
Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell to overwrite magnify.exe with cmd.exe
Accessibility Features
(T1015)
Enrichment
The capability enriched cmd.exe as being renamed to another process and with a relevant ATT&CK Technique (Masquerading). [CC3] Screenshot is not available due to sensitivity of rule logic. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for the modification of an accessibility features binary known to be used for privilege escalation. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe overwriting magnify.exe with cmd.exe via the copy command. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
18.A.1
Empire: 'Get-ChildItem' via PowerShell to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the Get-ChildItem command. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
18.B.1
Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell staged a file (Shockwave_network.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5) in the Recycle Bin (C:\$Recycle.Bin) on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)
Data Staged
(T1074)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe copying the .vsdx file from the network shared drive on Conficker (10.0.0.5) to the Recycle Bin as well as a file create event. [1] [2]
Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell collected a file (Shockwave_network.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
Data from Network Shared Drive
(T1039)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe copying the .vsdx file from the network shared drive on Conficker (10.0.0.5) to the Recycle Bin. [1]
19.A.1
Empire: File dropped to disk is a renamed copy of the WinRAR binary
Masquerading
(T1036)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1] [2] [3]
Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write binary (recycler.exe) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe creating recycler.exe. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
19.B.1
Empire: Executed binary (recycler.exe) created compressed archive (old.rar) of previously collected file
Data Compressed
(T1002)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (recycler) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2] [3]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed recycler.exe with full command-line arguments, including the use of the -hp flag to encrypt and compress data, indicating the WinRAR utility was in use. Additionally recycler.exe was identified as WinRAR via file metadata, including executable product and description. Telemetry also showed the creation of old.rar as the output of recycler.exe running. [1] [2] [3]
Empire: Executed binary (recycler.exe) created encrypted archive (old.rar) of previously collected file
Data Encrypted
(T1022)
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (recycler) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (powershell.exe). [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed recycler.exe with full command-line arguments, including the use of the -hp flag to encrypt and compress data, indicating the WinRAR utility was in use. [1] [2]
Empire: Executed binary (recycler.exe) is a renamed copy of the WinRAR binary
Masquerading
(T1036)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed recycler.exe with full command-line arguments, including the use of the -hp flag to encrypt and compress data, indicating the WinRAR utility was in use. Additionally recycler.exe was identified as WinRAR via file metadata, including executable product and description. [1] [2] [3]
19.C.1
Empire: Sequence of 'echo' commands via PowerShell to populate commands in text file (ftp.txt), which is then executed by FTP to exfil data through network connection separate of existing C2 channel
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
(T1048)
Specific Behavior
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for the execution of ftp.exe with a command file option by an unusual parent process and could be used for exfiltration. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed ftp.exe with ftp.txt as an argument as well as an outbound FTP connection to 192.168.0.4 (C2 server) on TCP port 21. [1] [2]
19.D.1
Empire: 'del C:\"$"Recycle.bin\old.rar'
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the command to delete old.rar. [1] [2]
19.D.2
Empire: 'del recycler.exe'
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the command to delete recycler.exe. [1] [2]
20.A.1
magnifer.exe previously overwritten by cmd.exe launched through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)
Accessibility Features
(T1015)
Enrichment
The capability enriched utilman.exe executing magnify.exe with a tag indicating that magnify was a persistent backdoor. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed magnify.exe executing from utilman.exe with the original file name of cmd.exe. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated for magnify.exe executing as a process with a renamed executable. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4) as part of execution of persistence mechanism
Remote Desktop Protocol
(T1076)
Enrichment
The capability enriched a Remote Desktop connection indicating a successful login to Remote Desktop Services. [1] [2] [3]
20.B.1
Executed 'whoami' via cmd persistence mechanism through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
Enrichment
The capability enriched whoami.exe with a tag identifying the command as enumeration. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
General Behavior
A General Behavior alert was generated showing that a spawned process (whoami) has been tagged for monitoring because its parent process has a detection (magnify.exe). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed whoami.exe was executed from magnify.exe. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]







Operational Flow The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

Step 1: Initial Compromise

1.A.1 Execution

User Execution

i. Legitimate user Debbie clicked and executed malicious self-extracting archive (Resume Viewer.exe) on 10.0.1.6 (Nimda)

1.A.1 Execution

Rundll32

i. Previously executed batch file (pdfhelper.cmd) launched a DLL payload (update.dat) using Rundll32

1.A.1 Execution

Scripting

i. Previously executed self-extracting archive (Resume Viewer.exe) launched an embedded batch file (pdfhelper.cmd)

1.B.1 Persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

i. Previously executed batch file (pdfhelper.cmd) moved a separate batch file (autoupdate.bat) to the Startup folder

1.C.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established using port 53

1.C.1 Command and Control

Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established using DNS traffic to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com

1.C.1 Command and Control

Data Encoding

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established using both NetBIOS and base64 encoding

Step 2: Initial Discover

2.A.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ipconfig -all' via cmd

2.A.2 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'arp -a' via cmd

2.B.1 Discovery

System Owner/User Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'echo' via cmd to enumerate specific environment variables

2.C.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

2.C.2 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'tasklist -v' via cmd

2.D.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'sc query' via cmd

2.D.2 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net start' via cmd

2.E.1 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'systeminfo' via cmd

2.E.2 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net config workstation' via cmd

2.F.1 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators' via cmd

2.F.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators -domain' via cmd

2.F.3 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Admins" -domain' via cmd

2.G.1 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net user -domain' via cmd

2.G.2 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net user george -domain' via cmd

2.H.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to enumerate a specific Registry key

Step 3: Privilege Escalation

3.A.1 Privilege Escalation

Bypass User Account Control

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication capability executed to elevate process integrity level

3.A.1 Privilege Escalation

Access Token Manipulation

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication capability executed to modify current process token

3.B.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

3.C.1 Privilege Escalation

Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in process injection capability executed to inject callback into cmd.exe

Step 4: Discovery for Lateral Movement

4.A.1 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Controllers" -domain' via cmd

4.A.2 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Computers" -domain' via cmd

4.B.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'netsh advfirewall show allprofiles' via cmd

4.C.1 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'netstat -ano' via cmd

Step 5: Credential Access

5.A.1 Credential Access

Credential Dumping

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in Mimikatz credential dump capability executed

5.A.1 Credential Access

Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Credential dump capability involved process injection into lsass

5.A.2 Credential Access

Credential Dumping

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in hash dump capability executed

5.A.2 Credential Access

Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Hash dump capability involved process injection into lsass.exe

5.B.1 Privilege Escalation

Access Token Manipulation

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in token theft capability executed to change user context to George

Step 6: Lateral Movement

6.A.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to remotely enumerate a specific Registry key on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

6.B.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to use port 80

6.B.1 Command and Control

Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to use HTTP traffic to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com

6.B.1 Command and Control

Multiband Communication

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to split communications between both HTTP and DNS

6.C.1 Lateral Movement

Remote Desktop Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to proxy RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 7: Persistence

7.A.1 Persistence

Create Account

i. Added user Jesse to Conficker (10.0.0.5) through RDP connection

7.A.1 Persistence

Graphical User Interface

i. Microsoft Management Console (Local Users and Groups snap-in) GUI utility used to add new user through RDP connection

7.A.1 Persistence

Account Discovery

i. Microsoft Management Console (Local Users and Groups snap-in) GUI utility displayed user account information

7.B.1 Command and Control

Remote File Copy

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in upload capability executed to write a DLL payload (updater.dll) to disk on Nimda (10.0.1.6)

7.C.1 Persistence

Scheduled Task

i. Cobalt Strike: 'schtasks' via cmd to create scheduled task that executes a DLL payload (updater.dll)

Step 8: Collection

8.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'dir -s -b "\\conficker\wormshare"' via cmd

8.A.2 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'tree "C:\Users\debbie"' via cmd

8.B.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

8.C.1 Collection

Input Capture

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in keylogging capability executed to capture keystrokes of user Debbie

8.C.1 Collection

Application Window Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: Keylogging capability included residual enumeration of application windows

8.D.1 Collection

Screen Capture

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in screen capture capability executed to capture screenshot of current window of user Debbie

8.D.1 Collection

Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Screen capture capability involved process injection into explorer.exe

Step 9: Exfiltration

9.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ls' (List) via Win32 APIs to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

9.B.1 Exfiltration

Data from Network Shared Drive

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in download capability executed to a collect file (Shockwave_rackb_diagram.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

9.B.1 Exfiltration

Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel

i. Cobalt Strike: Download capability exfiltrated data through existing C2 channel

Step 10: Execution of Persistence

10.A.1 Persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

i. Batch file (autoupdate.bat) previously written to Startup folder executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (update.dat) using Rundll32

10.A.2 Persistence

Scheduled Task

i. Scheduled task executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (updater.dll) using Rundll32

10.B.1 Persistence

Valid Accounts

i. RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5) authenticated using previously added user Jesse

10.B.1 Persistence

Remote Desktop Protocol

i. RDP connection made to Conficker (10.0.0.5) as part of execution of persistence mechanism

Step 11: Initial Access

11.A.1 Execution

Scripting

i. Legitimate user Bob clicked and executed malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) on 10.0.1.5 (CodeRed)

11.B.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port

i. Empire: C2 channel established using port 443

11.B.1 Command and Control

Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Empire: C2 channel established using HTTPS traffic to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com

11.B.1 Command and Control

Standard Cryptographic Protocol

i. Empire: Encrypted C2 channel established using HTTPS

Step 12: Initial Discover

12.A.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: 'route print' via PowerShell

12.A.2 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: 'ipconfig -all' via PowerShell

12.B.1 Discovery

System Owner/User Discovery

i. Empire: 'whoami -all -fo list' via PowerShell

12.C.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Empire: 'qprocess *' via PowerShell

12.D.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'net start' via PowerShell

12.E.1 Discovery

Scripting

i. Empire: Built-in WinEnum module executed to programmatically execute a series of enumeration techniques

12.E.1.1 Discovery

System Owner/User Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of user information

12.E.1.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AD group memberships

12.E.1.3 Discovery

Password Policy Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of password policy information

12.E.1.4.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of recently opened files

12.E.1.4.2 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of interesting files

12.E.1.5 Discovery

Clipboard Data

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of clipboard contents

12.E.1.6.1 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information

12.E.1.6.2 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of Windows update information

12.E.1.7 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information via a Registry query

12.E.1.8 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of services

12.E.1.9.1 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of available shares

12.E.1.9.2 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of mapped network drives

12.E.1.10.1 Discovery

Security Software Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AV solutions

12.E.1.10.2 Discovery

Security Software Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of firewall rules

12.E.1.11 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of network adapters

12.E.1.12 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of established network connections

12.F.1 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: 'net group "Domain Admins" -domain' via PowerShell

12.F.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: 'net�localgroup�administrators' via PowerShell

12.G.1 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Empire: 'net user' via PowerShell

12.G.2 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Empire: 'net user -domain' via PowerShell

Step 13: Discovery for Lateral Movement

13.A.1 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Empire: 'net group "Domain Computers" -domain' via PowerShell

13.B.1 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell

13.B.2 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: 'netstat -ano' via PowerShell

13.C.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Empire:�'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key

Step 14: Privilege Escalation

14.A.1 Privilege Escalation

Bypass User Account Control

i. Empire: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication module executed to launch new callback with elevated process integrity level

14.A.1 Privilege Escalation

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded and wrote a new Empire stager (wdbypass) to disk

14.A.1 Privilege Escalation

Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded a new Empire stager (wdbypass) over HTTP

14.A.1 Privilege Escalation

Commonly Used Port

i. Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded a new Empire stager (wdbypass) over port 8080

Step 15: Credential Access

15.A.1 Credential Access

Input Capture

i. Empire: Built-in keylogging module executed to capture keystrokes of user Bob

15.A.1 Credential Access

Application Window Discovery

i. Empire: Built-in keylogging module included residual enumeration of application windows

15.B.1 Credential Access

Credentials in Files

i. Empire: 'get-content' via PowerShell to collect sensitive file (it_tasks.txt) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 16: Lateral Movement

16.A.1 Credential Access

Brute Force

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to brute force password spraying authentication attempts to Morris (10.0.1.4) and Nimda (10.0.1.6) targeting credentials of users�Kmitnick, Bob, and Frieda

16.A.1 Credential Access

Windows Admin Shares

i. Empire: Brute force password spraying attempts targeted Windows admin shares on Morris (10.0.1.4) and Nimda (10.0.1.6)

16.B.1 Lateral Movement

Valid Accounts

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to successfully authenticate to Conficker (10.0.0.5) using credentials of user Kmitnick

16.B.1 Lateral Movement

Windows Admin Shares

i. Empire: Successful authentication targeted Windows admin share on Conficker (10.0.0.5)�

16.B.1 Lateral Movement

Brute Force

i. Empire: Successful authentication to Conficker (10.0.0.5) using credentials of user Kmitnick as a result of the brute force password spraying

16.C.1 Defense Evasion

Network Share Connection Removal

i. Empire: 'net use -delete' via PowerShell

16.D.1 Lateral Movement

Windows Admin Shares

i. Empire: Successful authentication targeted Windows admin shares on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

16.D.1 Lateral Movement

Valid Accounts

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to successfully authenticate to Creeper (10.0.0.4) using credentials of user Kmitnick

16.E.1 Command and Control

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

16.F.1 Execution

Command-Line Interface

i. Empire: Built-in runas module executed to launch malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) as user Kmitnick�

16.G.1 Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in move capability executed to write malicious VBScript (update.vbs) to disk on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.H.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'sc query' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate services on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.I.1 Privilege Escalation

New Service

i. Empire: 'sc create' via PowerShell to remotely create a service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.I.1 Privilege Escalation

Masquerading

i. Empire: 'sc description' via PowerShell to remotely disguise a service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.J.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'sc qc' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.K.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: 'type' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific file (update.vbs) on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.L.1 Execution

Service Execution

i. Empire: 'sc start' via PowerShell to remotely launch a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

Step 17: Persistence

17.A.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key associated with terminal services

17.A.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key

17.B.1 Persistence

File and Directory Permissions Modification

i. Empire: 'takeown' via PowerShell to obtain ownership of magnify.exe

17.B.2 Persistence

File and Directory Permissions Modification

i. Empire: 'icacls' via PowerShell to modify the DACL for magnify.exe

17.C.1 Persistence

Accessibility Features

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell to overwrite magnify.exe with cmd.exe

Step 18: Collection

18.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: 'Get-ChildItem' via PowerShell to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

18.B.1 Collection

Data Staged

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell staged a file (Shockwave_network.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5) in the Recycle Bin (C:\$Recycle.Bin) on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

18.B.1 Collection

Data from Network Shared Drive

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell collected a file (Shockwave_network.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 19: Exfiltration

19.A.1 Command and Control

Masquerading

i. Empire: File dropped to disk is a renamed copy of the WinRAR binary

19.A.1 Command and Control

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write binary (recycler.exe) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

19.B.1 Defense Evasion

Data Compressed

i. Empire: Executed binary (recycler.exe) created compressed archive (old.rar) of previously collected file

19.B.1 Defense Evasion

Data Encrypted

i. Empire: Executed binary (recycler.exe) created encrypted archive (old.rar) of previously collected file

19.B.1 Exfiltration

Masquerading

i. Empire: Executed binary (recycler.exe) is a renamed copy of the WinRAR binary

19.C.1 Defense Evasion

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

i. Empire: Sequence of 'echo' commands via PowerShell to populate commands in text file (ftp.txt), which is then executed by FTP to exfil data through network connection separate of existing C2 channel

19.D.1 Defense Evasion

File Deletion

i. Empire: 'del C:\"$"Recycle.bin\old.rar'

19.D.2 Defense Evasion

File Deletion

i. Empire: 'del recycler.exe'

Step 20: Execution of Persistence

20.A.1 Persistence

Accessibility Features

i. magnifer.exe previously overwritten by cmd.exe launched through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)

20.A.1 Persistence

Remote Desktop Protocol

i. RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4) as part of execution of persistence mechanism

20.B.1 Execution

System Owner/User Discovery

i. Executed 'whoami' via cmd persistence mechanism through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)