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Tactic Results: Lateral Movement Tactic Page Information

The ATT&CK tactic page displays all tested techniques belonging to that tactic, as well as all procedures and their respective detections. The procedures are grouped by their technique. The Procedure column contains a description of how the technique was tested. The Step column is where in the operational flow the procedure occurred. Click the Step Number to view it in the Operational Flow panel. Detections are classified by one or more Detection Types, summarized by the Detection Notes, and may be supported by Screenshots. The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.
Vendor Configuration      All Results JSON     Legend
Legend
Main Detection Categories: Detection Modifiers:

None

Telemetry

Indicator of Compromise

General Behavior

Specific Behavior

Enrichment

Tainted

Delayed

Configuration Change
Technique
Procedures Step
Detection Type Detection Notes
Screenshots
Remote Desktop Protocol
(T1076)
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to proxy RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5)
6.C.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed a connection for logon type 10 (interactive logon) and a connection to 10.0.0.5 (Conficker) over TCP port 3389.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
The OverWatch team sent an email indicating a General Behavior was observed because they identified suspicious communications over port 3389 (RDP) to other hosts. OverWatch is the managed threat hunting service. The team sent emails to MITRE to mimic what they would send in a real incident.
Telemetry showing logon type 10 (interactive remote login) as user George@shockwave on 10.0.0.5 (Conficker)
Telemetry showing a network connection to 10.0.0.5 (Conficker) over TCP port 3389
Email excerpt from the OverWatch team indicating suspicious communications over 3389 (RDP) were observed (General Behavior)
RDP connection made to Conficker (10.0.0.5) as part of execution of persistence mechanism
10.B.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the remote connection to Conficker for a user logon by Jesse with type 10 (interactive) as well as the use of rdpclip.exe by the logged-on user.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
The OverWatch team sent an email indicating a General Behavior occurred because they observed suspicious communications over 3389 (RDP) to other hosts. OverWatch is the managed threat hunting service. The team sent emails to MITRE to mimic what they would send in a real incident.
Telemetry showing user logon by Jesse to Conficker with type 10 (interactive logon)
Telemetry showing logged-on user activity, including the use of rdpclip.exe
Email excerpt from the OverWatch team indicating suspicious communications over 3389 (RDP) were observed (General Behavior)
RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4) as part of execution of persistence mechanism
20.A.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed a logon type 10 (remote interactive logon) for Kmitnick on Creeper, indicating a RDP session was established and logged into.
Telemetry showing logon type 10 (remote interactive logon) for Kmitnick on Creeper
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Cobalt Strike: Built-in upload capability executed to write a DLL payload (updater.dll) to disk on Nimda (10.0.1.6)
7.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the file write for updater.dll into the system32 folder by user George. The telemetry was tainted by the parent "unexpected process" alert.
Telemetry showing file write for updater.dll (tainted by the parent "unexpected process" alert)
Additional telemetry showing file write for updater.dll
Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded and wrote a new Empire stager (wdbypass) to disk
14.A.1
Specific Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
The OverWatch team sent an email indicating a Specific Behavior was observed because PowerShell retrieved the file wdbypass from www.freegoogleadsenseinfo.com (C2 domain) over port 8080. OverWatch is the managed threat hunting service. The team sent emails to MITRE to mimic what they would send in a real incident.
Email excerpt from the OverWatch team indicating PowerShell retrieved the file wdbypass (Specific Behavior)
Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)
16.E.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed File Write and New Script Write events for autoupdate.vbs under powershell.exe. The telemetry was tainted by a previous detection.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
The OverWatch team sent an email indicating a General Behavior was observed because a .vbs was written to the filesystem, which was likely used to carry out additional actions. OverWatch is the managed threat hunting service. The team sent emails to MITRE to mimic what they would send in a real incident.
Telemetry showing File Write and New Script Write for autoupdate.vbs within powershell.exe (tainted by previous detection by orange line indicating medium severity)
Excerpt from email sent by OverWatch team indicating they observed autoupdate.vbs written (General Behavior)
Empire: Built-in move capability executed to write malicious VBScript (update.vbs) to disk on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
16.G.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed update.vbs written to the C$ remote share on host 10.0.0.4 (Creeper).
Telemetry showing update.vbs with event_name NewScriptWritten indicating a write to C$
Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write binary (recycler.exe) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)
19.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed file write of recycler.exe by powershell.exe as well as the network connection over which the download occurred. The process tree view showed the parent powershell.exe process as tainted by a previous wscript.exe detection.
Telemetry showing file write of recycler.exe (parent powershell.exe tainted by previous wscript.exe detection by red line indicating high severity)
Telemetry showing network connection from 192.168.0.5 (C2 server) used by powershell.exe to transfer recycler.exe (parent powershell.exe tainted by previous wscript.exe detection by red line indicating high severity)
Windows Admin Shares
(T1077)
Empire: Brute force password spraying attempts targeted Windows admin shares on Morris (10.0.1.4) and Nimda (10.0.1.6)
16.A.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed repeated logon attempts via net.exe with command-line arguments targeting ADMIN$ shares on the machines 10.0.1.4 (Morris) and 10.0.1.6 (Nimda).
General Behavior (Delayed, Tainted)
  
  
OverWatch generated General Behavior alerts indicating the net use commands attempting logon to ADMIN$ shares were suspicious. The alerts were tainted by a parent powershell.exe detection. OverWatch is the managed threat hunting service.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
The OverWatch team also sent an email indicating a General Behavior was observed because the user Bob attempted to move laterally to access resources on the network. OverWatch is the managed threat hunting service. The team sent emails to MITRE to mimic what they would send in a real incident.
Telemetry showing net use logon attempts to ADMIN$ shares
Process tree view of OverWatch General Behavior alerts indicating net.exe commands were suspicious (net.exe command details not specifically shown, tainted by previous powershell.exe detection by red line indicating high severity)
Excerpt from email sent by OverWatch team indicating Bob attempted to move laterally to access network resources (General Behavior)
Empire: Successful authentication targeted Windows admin share on Conficker (10.0.0.5) 
16.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed a logon attempt via net.exe with command-line arguments to connect to ADMIN$ on 10.0.0.5 (Conficker) as the user Kmitnick (following multiple failed net use attempts). The telemetry was tainted by a previous powershell.exe detection.
General Behavior (Delayed, Tainted)
  
  
OverWatch generated a General Behavior alert indicating the successful net use connection to ADMIN$ was suspicious. The alert was tainted by a parent powershell.exe detection. OverWatch is the managed threat hunting service.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
The OverWatch team also sent an email indicating a General Behavior was observed because the user Bob attempted to move laterally to access resources on the network. OverWatch is the managed threat hunting service. The team sent emails to MITRE to mimic what they would send in a real incident.
Telemetry from process tree showing successful net use connection to ADMIN$ (tainted by previous powershell.exe detection by red line indicating high severity. The vendor noted the process tree view and severities change as detections occur.)
OverWatch General Behavior alert indicating successful net use connection to ADMIN$ was suspicious (would be tainted by previous powershell.exe detection by orange line indicating medium severity in process tree view that is not shown)
Excerpt from email sent by OverWatch team indicating Bob attempted to move laterally to access network resources (General Behavior)
Empire: Successful authentication targeted Windows admin shares on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
16.D.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed a logon attempt via net.exe with command-line arguments to the C$ share on 10.0.0.4 (Creeper) as the user Kmitnick. The telemetry was tainted by a previous powershell.exe detection.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
The OverWatch team sent an email indicating a General Behavior was observed because the user Bob attempted to move laterally to access resources on the network. OverWatch is the managed threat hunting service. The team sent emails to MITRE to mimic what they would send in a real incident.
Telemetry showing process tree containing successful net use connection to C$ (tainted by previous powershell.exe detection by red line indicating high severity)
Excerpt from email sent by OverWatch team indicating Bob attempted to move laterally to access network resources (General Behavior)


Operational Flow

The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

Step 1: Initial Compromise

1.A.1 Execution

User Execution, Rundll32, Scripting

i. Legitimate user Debbie clicked and executed malicious self-extracting archive (Resume Viewer.exe) on 10.0.1.6 (Nimda)

1.B.1 Persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

i. Previously executed batch file (pdfhelper.cmd) moved a separate batch file (autoupdate.bat) to the Startup folder

1.C.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Data Encoding, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established

Step 2: Initial Discover

2.A.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ipconfig /all' via cmd

2.A.2 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'arp -a' via cmd

2.B.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'echo' via cmd to enumerate specific environment variables

2.C.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

2.C.2 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'tasklist /v' via cmd

2.D.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'sc query' via cmd

2.D.2 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net start' via cmd

2.E.1 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'systeminfo' via cmd

2.E.2 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net config workstation' via cmd

2.F.1 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators' via cmd

2.F.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators /domain' via cmd

2.F.3 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' via cmd

2.G.1 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net user /domain' via cmd

2.G.2 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net user george /domain' via cmd

2.H.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to enumerate a specific Registry key

Step 3: Privilege Escalation

3.A.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Access Token Manipulation, Bypass User Account Control

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication capability executed to elevate process integrity level

3.B.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

3.C.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in process injection capability executed to inject callback into cmd.exe

Step 4: Discovery for Lateral Movement

4.A.1 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Controllers" /domain' via cmd

4.A.2 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain' via cmd

4.B.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'netsh advfirewall show allprofiles' via cmd

4.C.1 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'netstat -ano' via cmd

Step 5: Credential Access

5.A.1 Credential Access

Credential Dumping, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in Mimikatz credential dump capability executed

5.A.2 Credential Access

Credential Dumping, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in hash dump capability executed

5.B.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Access Token Manipulation

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in token theft capability executed to change user context to George

Step 6: Lateral Movement

6.A.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to remotely enumerate a specific Registry key on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

6.B.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Multiband Communication, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified

6.C.1 Lateral Movement

Remote Desktop Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to proxy RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 7: Persistence

7.A.1 Persistence

Create Account, Graphical user Interface, Account Discovery

i. Added user Jesse to Conficker (10.0.0.5) through RDP connection

7.B.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in upload capability executed to write a DLL payload (updater.dll) to disk on Nimda (10.0.1.6)

7.C.1 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Scheduled Task

i. Cobalt Strike: 'schtasks' via cmd to create scheduled task that executes a DLL payload (updater.dll)

Step 8: Collection

8.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'dir /s /b "\\conficker\wormshare"' via cmd

8.A.2 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'tree "C:\Users\debbie"' via cmd

8.B.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

8.C.1 Collection, Credential Access

Input Capture, Application Window Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in keylogging capability executed to capture keystrokes of user Debbie

8.D.1 Collection

Screen Capture, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in screen capture capability executed to capture screenshot of current window of user Debbie

Step 9: Exfiltration

9.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ls' (List) via Win32 APIs to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

9.B.1 Collection

Data from Data from Network Shared Drive, Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in download capability executed to a collect file (Shockwave_rackb_diagram.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 10: Execution of Persistence

10.A.1 Persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

i. Batch file (autoupdate.bat) previously written to Startup folder executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (update.dat) using Rundll32

10.A.2 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Scheduled Task

i. Scheduled task executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (updater.dll) using Rundll32

10.B.1 Lateral Movement

Remote Desktop Protocol, Valid Accounts

i. RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5) authenticated using previously added user Jesse

Step 11: Initial Access

11.A.1 Defense Evasion, Execution

Scripting

i. Legitimate user Bob clicked and executed malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) on 10.0.1.5 (CodeRed)

11.B.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Standard Application Layer Protocol, Standard Cryptographic Protocol

i. Empire: C2 channel established

Step 12: Initial Discover

12.A.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: 'route print' via PowerShell

12.A.2 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: 'ipconfig /all' via PowerShell

12.B.1 Discovery

System Owner/User Discovery

i. Empire: 'whoami /all /fo list' via PowerShell

12.C.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Empire: 'qprocess *' via PowerShell

12.D.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'net start' via PowerShell

12.E.1 Defense Evasion, Execution

Scripting

i. Empire: Built-in WinEnum module executed to programmatically execute a series of enumeration techniques

12.E.1.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of user information

12.E.1.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AD group memberships

12.E.1.3 Discovery

Password Policy Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of password policy information

12.E.1.4.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of recently opened files

12.E.1.4.2 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of interesting files

12.E.1.5 Collection

Clipboard Data

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of clipboard contents

12.E.1.6.1 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information

12.E.1.6.2 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of Windows update information

12.E.1.7 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information via a Registry query

12.E.1.8 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of services

12.E.1.9.1 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of available shares

12.E.1.9.2 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of mapped network drives

12.E.1.10.1 Discovery

Security Software Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AV solutions

12.E.1.10.2 Discovery

Security Software Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of firewall rules

12.E.1.11 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of network adapters

12.E.1.12 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of established network connections

12.F.1 Discovery

Permissions Group Discovery

i. Empire: 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' via PowerShell

12.F.2 Discovery

Permissions Group Discovery

i. Empire: 'net localgroup administrators' via PowerShell

12.G.1 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Empire: 'net user' via PowerShell

12.G.2 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Empire: 'net user /domain' via PowerShell

Step 13: Discovery for Lateral Movement

13.A.1 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Empire: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain' via PowerShell

13.B.1 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell

13.B.2 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: 'netstat -ano' via PowerShell

13.C.1 Discovery

Querying the Registry

i. Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key

Step 14: Privilege Escalation

14.A.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Bypass User Account Control, Commonly Used Port, Remote File Copy, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Empire: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication module executed to launch new callback with elevated process integrity level

Step 15: Credential Access

15.A.1 Discovery

Application Window Discovery, Input Capture

i. Empire: Built-in keylogging module executed to capture keystrokes of user Bob

15.B.1 Credential Access

Credentials in Files

i. Empire: 'get-content' via PowerShell to collect sensitive file (it_tasks.txt) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 16: Lateral Movement

16.A.1 Credential Access

Brute Force, Windows Admin Shares

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to brute force password spraying authentication attempts to Morris (10.0.1.4) and Nimda (10.0.1.6) targeting credentials of users Kmitnick, Bob, and Frieda

16.B.1 Lateral Movement

Windows Admin Shares, Valid Accounts , Brute Force

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to successfully authenticate to Conficker (10.0.0.5) using credentials of user Kmitnick

16.C.1 Defense Evasion

Network Share Connection Removal

i. Empire: 'net use /delete' via PowerShell

16.D.1 Lateral Movement

Windows Admin Shares, Valid Accounts

i. Empire: Successful authentication targeted Windows admin shares on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

16.E.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

16.F.1 Execution

Command-Line Interface

i. Empire: Built-in runas module executed to launch malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) as user Kmitnick

16.G.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in move capability executed to write malicious VBScript (update.vbs) to disk on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.H.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'sc query' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate services on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.I.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

New Service, Masquerading

i. Empire: 'sc create' via PowerShell to remotely create a service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.J.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'sc qc' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.K.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: 'type' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific file (update.vbs) on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.L.1 Execution

Service Execution

i. Empire: 'sc start' via PowerShell to remotely launch a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

Step 17: Persistence

17.A.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery, Query Registry

i. Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key associated with terminal services

17.B.1 Defense Evasion

File Permissions Modification

i. Empire: 'takeown' via PowerShell to obtain ownership of magnify.exe

17.B.2 Defense Evasion

File Permissions Modification

i. Empire: 'icacls' via PowerShell to modify the DACL for magnify.exe

17.C.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Accessibility Features

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell to overwrite magnify.exe with cmd.exe

Step 18: Collection

18.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: 'Get-ChildItem' via PowerShell to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

18.B.1 Collection

Data Staged, Data from Network Shared Drive

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell staged a file (Shockwave_network.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5) in the Recycle Bin (C:\$Recycle.Bin) on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

Step 19: Exfiltration

19.A.1 Defense Evasion

Masquerading, Remote File Copy

i. Empire: File dropped to disk is a renamed copy of the WinRAR binary

19.B.1 Exfiltration

Data Compressed, Data Encrypted, Masquerading

i. Empire: Executed binary (recycler.exe) created compressed archive (old.rar) of previously collected file

19.C.1 Exfiltration

Exfiltration over Alternative Protocol

i. Empire: Sequence of 'echo' commands via PowerShell to populate commands in text file (ftp.txt), which is then executed by FTP to exfil data through network connection separate of existing C2 channel

19.D.1 Defense Evasion

File Deletion

i. Empire: 'del C:\"$"Recycle.bin\old.rar'

19.D.2 Defense Evasion

File Deletion

i. Empire: 'del recycler.exe'

Step 20: Execution of Persistence

20.A.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Accessibility Features, Remote Desktop Protocol

i. magnifer.exe previously overwritten by cmd.exe launched through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)

20.B.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Executed 'whoami' via cmd persistence mechanism through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)