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Tactic Results: Command and Control Tactic Page Information

The ATT&CK tactic page displays all tested techniques belonging to that tactic, as well as all procedures and their respective detections. The procedures are grouped by their technique. The Procedure column contains a description of how the technique was tested. The Step column is where in the operational flow the procedure occurred. Click the Step Number to view it in the Operational Flow panel. Detections are classified by one or more Detection Types, summarized by the Detection Notes, and may be supported by Screenshots. The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

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Vendor Configuration      All Results     JSON     Legend
Legend
Main Detection Categories: Detection Modifiers:

None

Telemetry

Indicator of Compromise

General Behavior

Specific Behavior

Enrichment

Tainted

Delayed

Configuration Change
Technique
Procedures Step
Detection Type Detection Notes
Screenshots
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established using port 53
1.C.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. DNS requests were observed (no detection showed port 53 specifically).
Telemetry showing DNS requests to the C2 domain (custom query) (does not count as a detection)
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to use port 80
6.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for rundll32.exe opening a connection to 192.186.0.4 (C2 server) over port 80. The telemetry was tainted by the relationship to the previous alert on unexpected behavior originating from rundll32.exe.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for rundll32.exe opening network connection
Incident graph from "Unexpected process behavior" alert (resulting from rundll32.exe) showing tainted network connection
Empire: C2 channel established using port 443
11.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed powershell.exe checking an SSL certificate and then communicating to 192.168.0.5 (C2 server) over port 443 (tainted by relationship to alert on PowerShell script with suspicious content). Telemetry within an alert also showed decoded command-line arguments containing port 443.
Telemetry showing powershell.exe communicating over TCP port 443
Telemetry showing powershell.exe communicating to 192.168.0.5 (C2 server)
Telemetry within alert showing decoded command-line arguments containing port 443 and tainted relationship to the powershell.exe process
Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded a new Empire stager (wdbypass) over port 8080
14.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed a connection to 192.168.0.5 (C2 server) on port 8080 was made (tainted by alert on suspicious PowerShell command-line arguments).
Telemetry showing network connection to 192.168.0.5 (C2 server) over port 8080
Telemetry showing decoded PowerShell script with download HTTP request of wdbypass over port 8080 and tainted relationship to alert on suspicious PowerShell command-line arguments
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established using DNS traffic to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com
1.C.1
Telemetry (Configuration Change)
  
 
Telemetry from showed DNS requests to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com (C2 domain). The vendor stated that DNS telemetry is captured but it was not immediately visible in the portal. The vendor made changes to the portal during the test to enable by default the visibility of these events.
Telemetry showing DNS requests to the C2 domain (custom query)
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to use HTTP traffic to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com
6.B.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though telemetry showed a connection to port 80 (no detection showed HTTP specifically).
Empire: C2 channel established using HTTPS traffic to freegoogleadsenseinfo.com
11.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed powershell.exe checking an SSL certificate and then communicating to 192.168.0.5 (C2 server) over an encrypted channel (tainted by relationship to alert on PowerShell script with suspicious content). Telemetry within an alert showed decoded command-line arguments to perform HTTPS connection to C2 domain.
Indicator of Compromise (Configuration Change)
  
 
An Indicator of Compromise alert was generated on the C2 domain. Vendor added detection for evaluation C2 domain using the standard customer-facing custom detection capabilities of the product.
Telemetry showing powershell.exe communicating to 192.168.0.5 (C2 server) over an encrypted channel
Telemetry within alert showing decoded command-line arguments containing HTTPS
Alert for C2 domain indicator of compromise 
Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded a new Empire stager (wdbypass) over HTTP
14.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed a decoded PowerShell script invoked that created a web request to the C2 server with related data showing the connection was made (tainted by alert on suspicious PowerShell command-line arguments).
Telemetry showing decoded PowerShell script with download HTTP request of wdbypass over port 8080 and tainted relationship to alert on suspicious PowerShell command-line arguments
Data Encoding
(T1132)
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established using both NetBIOS and base64 encoding
1.C.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Multiband Communication
(T1026)
Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to split communications between both HTTP and DNS
6.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed an execution sequence for rundll32.exe opening a connection to 192.168.0.4 (C2 server) over port 80, and prior activity showed DNS traffic to the same C2 IP address, which could indicate multiband communication. The port 80 telemetry was tainted by the relationship to the previous alert on unexpected behavior originating from rundll32.exe. 
Telemetry showing execution sequence for rundll32.exe opening port 80 network connection
Incident graph from "Unexpected process behavior" alert (resulting from rundll32.exe) showing tainted network connection
Telemetry showing DNS traffic to C2 domain
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Cobalt Strike: Built-in upload capability executed to write a DLL payload (updater.dll) to disk on Nimda (10.0.1.6)
7.B.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed cmd.exe writing updater.dll to disk.
Telemetry showing file write of updater.dll
Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded and executed a new Empire stager (wdbypass)
14.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed network connection to 192.168.0.5 (C2 server) over port 8080 as well as decoded PowerShell making a connection over port 8080 with a HTTP request to download wdbypass payload. (tainted by alert on suspicious PowerShell command-line arguments).
Telemetry showing network connection to 192.168.0.5 (C2 server) over port 8080
Telemetry showing decoded PowerShell script with download HTTP request of wdbypass over port 8080 and tainted relationship to alert on suspicious PowerShell command-line arguments
Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)
16.E.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed powershell.exe creating autoupdate.vbs (tainted by parent alert on PowerShell script with suspicious content).
Telemetry showing autoupdate.vbs creation (tainted by parent alert on PowerShell script with suspicious content)
Process tree view of alert on a PowerShell script with suspicious content showing tainted parent powershell.exe process (alert was generated on many PowerShell script executions throughout the day, specific instance of this procedure not shown in this alert)
Empire: Built-in move capability executed to write malicious VBScript (update.vbs) to disk on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
16.G.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed creation of update.vbs on 10.0.0.4 (Creeper) and the remote file copy action from 10.0.1.5 (CodeRed) (the remote file copy event on CodeRed was tainted by parent PowerShell alerts).
Telemetry showing file creation of update.vbs on 10.0.0.4 (Creeper)
Telemetry showing for remote creation of update.vbs on 10.0.0.4 (Creeper) from 10.0.1.5 (CodeRed)
Parent alert for PowerShell script with suspicious content tainting powershell.exe on CodeRed (alert was generated on many PowerShell script executions throughout the day, specific instance of this procedure not shown in this alert)
Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write binary (recycler.exe) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)
19.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed powershell.exe creating recycler.exe file (tainted by alert on PowerShell script with a suspicious command-line was generated by numerous scripts).
Telemetry showing file creation of recycler.exe by powershell.exe showing hash and signer information as win.rar GmbH
Alert description for PowerShell script with a suspicious command-line that tainted this event (alert specific to this instance not shown)
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
Empire: Encrypted C2 channel established using HTTPS
11.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed powershell.exe checking an SSL certificate and then communicating to 192.168.0.5 (C2 server) over an encrypted channel (tainted by relationship to alert on PowerShell script with suspicious content). Telemetry within an alert showed decoded command-line arguments to perform HTTPS connection to C2 domain.
Telemetry showing powershell.exe communicating to 192.168.0.5 (C2 server) over an encrypted channel
Telemetry within alert showing decoded command-line arguments containing HTTPS







Operational Flow

The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

Step 1: Initial Compromise

1.A.1 Execution

User Execution, Rundll32, Scripting

i. Legitimate user Debbie clicked and executed malicious self-extracting archive (Resume Viewer.exe) on 10.0.1.6 (Nimda)

1.B.1 Persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

i. Previously executed batch file (pdfhelper.cmd) moved a separate batch file (autoupdate.bat) to the Startup folder

1.C.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Data Encoding, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established

Step 2: Initial Discover

2.A.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ipconfig /all' via cmd

2.A.2 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'arp -a' via cmd

2.B.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'echo' via cmd to enumerate specific environment variables

2.C.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

2.C.2 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'tasklist /v' via cmd

2.D.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'sc query' via cmd

2.D.2 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net start' via cmd

2.E.1 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'systeminfo' via cmd

2.E.2 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net config workstation' via cmd

2.F.1 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators' via cmd

2.F.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators /domain' via cmd

2.F.3 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' via cmd

2.G.1 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net user /domain' via cmd

2.G.2 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net user george /domain' via cmd

2.H.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to enumerate a specific Registry key

Step 3: Privilege Escalation

3.A.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Access Token Manipulation, Bypass User Account Control

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication capability executed to elevate process integrity level

3.B.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

3.C.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in process injection capability executed to inject callback into cmd.exe

Step 4: Discovery for Lateral Movement

4.A.1 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Controllers" /domain' via cmd

4.A.2 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain' via cmd

4.B.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'netsh advfirewall show allprofiles' via cmd

4.C.1 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'netstat -ano' via cmd

Step 5: Credential Access

5.A.1 Credential Access

Credential Dumping, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in Mimikatz credential dump capability executed

5.A.2 Credential Access

Credential Dumping, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in hash dump capability executed

5.B.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Access Token Manipulation

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in token theft capability executed to change user context to George

Step 6: Lateral Movement

6.A.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to remotely enumerate a specific Registry key on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

6.B.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Multiband Communication, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified

6.C.1 Lateral Movement

Remote Desktop Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to proxy RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 7: Persistence

7.A.1 Persistence

Create Account, Graphical user Interface, Account Discovery

i. Added user Jesse to Conficker (10.0.0.5) through RDP connection

7.B.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in upload capability executed to write a DLL payload (updater.dll) to disk on Nimda (10.0.1.6)

7.C.1 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Scheduled Task

i. Cobalt Strike: 'schtasks' via cmd to create scheduled task that executes a DLL payload (updater.dll)

Step 8: Collection

8.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'dir /s /b "\\conficker\wormshare"' via cmd

8.A.2 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'tree "C:\Users\debbie"' via cmd

8.B.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

8.C.1 Collection, Credential Access

Input Capture, Application Window Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in keylogging capability executed to capture keystrokes of user Debbie

8.D.1 Collection

Screen Capture, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in screen capture capability executed to capture screenshot of current window of user Debbie

Step 9: Exfiltration

9.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ls' (List) via Win32 APIs to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

9.B.1 Collection

Data from Data from Network Shared Drive, Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in download capability executed to a collect file (Shockwave_rackb_diagram.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 10: Execution of Persistence

10.A.1 Persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

i. Batch file (autoupdate.bat) previously written to Startup folder executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (update.dat) using Rundll32

10.A.2 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Scheduled Task

i. Scheduled task executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (updater.dll) using Rundll32

10.B.1 Lateral Movement

Remote Desktop Protocol, Valid Accounts

i. RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5) authenticated using previously added user Jesse

Step 11: Initial Access

11.A.1 Defense Evasion, Execution

Scripting

i. Legitimate user Bob clicked and executed malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) on 10.0.1.5 (CodeRed)

11.B.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Standard Application Layer Protocol, Standard Cryptographic Protocol

i. Empire: C2 channel established

Step 12: Initial Discover

12.A.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: 'route print' via PowerShell

12.A.2 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: 'ipconfig /all' via PowerShell

12.B.1 Discovery

System Owner/User Discovery

i. Empire: 'whoami /all /fo list' via PowerShell

12.C.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Empire: 'qprocess *' via PowerShell

12.D.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'net start' via PowerShell

12.E.1 Defense Evasion, Execution

Scripting

i. Empire: Built-in WinEnum module executed to programmatically execute a series of enumeration techniques

12.E.1.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of user information

12.E.1.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AD group memberships

12.E.1.3 Discovery

Password Policy Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of password policy information

12.E.1.4.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of recently opened files

12.E.1.4.2 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of interesting files

12.E.1.5 Collection

Clipboard Data

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of clipboard contents

12.E.1.6.1 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information

12.E.1.6.2 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of Windows update information

12.E.1.7 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information via a Registry query

12.E.1.8 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of services

12.E.1.9.1 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of available shares

12.E.1.9.2 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of mapped network drives

12.E.1.10.1 Discovery

Security Software Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AV solutions

12.E.1.10.2 Discovery

Security Software Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of firewall rules

12.E.1.11 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of network adapters

12.E.1.12 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of established network connections

12.F.1 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' via PowerShell

12.F.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: 'net localgroup administrators' via PowerShell

12.G.1 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Empire: 'net user' via PowerShell

12.G.2 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Empire: 'net user /domain' via PowerShell

Step 13: Discovery for Lateral Movement

13.A.1 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Empire: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain' via PowerShell

13.B.1 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell

13.B.2 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: 'netstat -ano' via PowerShell

13.C.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key

Step 14: Privilege Escalation

14.A.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Bypass User Account Control, Commonly Used Port, Remote File Copy, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded and executed a new Empire stager (wdbypass)

Step 15: Credential Access

15.A.1 Discovery

Application Window Discovery, Input Capture

i. Empire: Built-in keylogging module executed to capture keystrokes of user Bob

15.B.1 Credential Access

Credentials in Files

i. Empire: 'get-content' via PowerShell to collect sensitive file (it_tasks.txt) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 16: Lateral Movement

16.A.1 Credential Access

Brute Force, Windows Admin Shares

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to brute force password spraying authentication attempts to Morris (10.0.1.4) and Nimda (10.0.1.6) targeting credentials of users Kmitnick, Bob, and Frieda

16.B.1 Lateral Movement

Windows Admin Shares, Valid Accounts , Brute Force

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to successfully authenticate to Conficker (10.0.0.5) using credentials of user Kmitnick

16.C.1 Defense Evasion

Network Share Connection Removal

i. Empire: 'net use /delete' via PowerShell

16.D.1 Lateral Movement

Windows Admin Shares, Valid Accounts

i. Empire: Successful authentication targeted Windows admin shares on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

16.E.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

16.F.1 Execution

Command-Line Interface

i. Empire: Built-in runas module executed to launch malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) as user Kmitnick

16.G.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in move capability executed to write malicious VBScript (update.vbs) to disk on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.H.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'sc query' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate services on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.I.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

New Service, Masquerading

i. Empire: 'sc create' via PowerShell to remotely create a service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.J.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'sc qc' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.K.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: 'type' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific file (update.vbs) on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.L.1 Execution

Service Execution

i. Empire: 'sc start' via PowerShell to remotely launch a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

Step 17: Persistence

17.A.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery, Query Registry

i. Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key associated with terminal services

17.B.1 Defense Evasion

File Permissions Modification

i. Empire: 'takeown' via PowerShell to obtain ownership of magnify.exe

17.B.2 Defense Evasion

File Permissions Modification

i. Empire: 'icacls' via PowerShell to modify the DACL for magnify.exe

17.C.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Accessibility Features

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell to overwrite magnify.exe with cmd.exe

Step 18: Collection

18.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: 'Get-ChildItem' via PowerShell to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

18.B.1 Collection

Data Staged, Data from Network Shared Drive

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell staged a file (Shockwave_network.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5) in the Recycle Bin (C:\$Recycle.Bin) on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

Step 19: Exfiltration

19.A.1 Defense Evasion

Masquerading, Remote File Copy

i. Empire: File dropped to disk is a renamed copy of the WinRAR binary

19.B.1 Exfiltration

Data Compressed, Data Encrypted, Masquerading

i. Empire: Executed binary (recycler.exe) created compressed archive (old.rar) of previously collected file

19.C.1 Exfiltration

Exfiltration over Alternative Protocol

i. Empire: Sequence of 'echo' commands via PowerShell to populate commands in text file (ftp.txt), which is then executed by FTP to exfil data through network connection separate of existing C2 channel

19.D.1 Defense Evasion

File Deletion

i. Empire: 'del C:\"$"Recycle.bin\old.rar'

19.D.2 Defense Evasion

File Deletion

i. Empire: 'del recycler.exe'

Step 20: Execution of Persistence

20.A.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Accessibility Features, Remote Desktop Protocol

i. magnifer.exe previously overwritten by cmd.exe launched through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)

20.B.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Executed 'whoami' via cmd persistence mechanism through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)