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Windows Defender ATP
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Tactic Results: Discovery Tactic Page Information

The ATT&CK tactic page displays all tested techniques belonging to that tactic, as well as all procedures and their respective detections. The procedures are grouped by their technique. The Procedure column contains a description of how the technique was tested. The Step column is where in the operational flow the procedure occurred. Click the Step Number to view it in the Operational Flow panel. Detections are classified by one or more Detection Types, summarized by the Detection Notes, and may be supported by Screenshots. The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

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Vendor Configuration      All Results     JSON     Legend
Legend
Main Detection Categories: Detection Modifiers:

None

Telemetry

Indicator of Compromise

General Behavior

Specific Behavior

Enrichment

Tainted

Delayed

Configuration Change
Technique
Procedures Step
Detection Type Detection Notes
Screenshots
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
Cobalt Strike: 'ipconfig /all' via cmd
2.A.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe executing ipconfig.exe with command-line arguments.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert occurred due to a sequence of exploration commands that was classified as suspicious.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for ipconfig.exe with command-line arguments
General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of discovery techniques
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of discovery techniques
Cobalt Strike: 'arp -a' via cmd
2.A.2
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe executing arp.exe with command-line arguments.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert occurred due to a sequence of exploration activities that was classified as suspicious.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for arp.exe with command-line arguments
General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities showing arp.exe
Cobalt Strike: 'netsh advfirewall show allprofiles' via cmd
4.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe executing netsh.exe with command-line arguments (tainted by the alert on suspicious process injection alert association with rundll32.exe).
Telemetry showing execution sequence for netsh.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of prior suspicious process injection alert showing tainted powershell.exe child cmd.exe process performing this action (specific netsh.exe command not shown)
Empire: 'route print' via PowerShell
12.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for powershell.exe executing route.exe with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by previous "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" and suspicious PowerShell cmdlet alerts.
Telemetry showing execution sequence of powershell.exe executing route.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" alert showing tainted powershell.exe process
Process tree view of powershell.exe with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process
Empire: 'ipconfig /all' via PowerShell
12.A.2
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for powershell.exe executing ipconfig.exe with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by previous "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" and suspicious PowerShell cmdlet alerts.
Telemetry showing execution sequence of powershell.exe executing ipconfig.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" alert showing tainted powershell.exe process
Process tree view of powershell.exe with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of network adapters
12.E.1.11
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed invocation of the PowerShell cmdlet Get-NetInfo.
Telemetry of execution sequence showing Get-NetInfo invocation
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
Cobalt Strike: 'echo' via cmd to enumerate specific environment variables
2.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe executing echo with command-line arguments (tainted by the alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities from child processes of rundll32.exe).
Telemetry showing execution sequence for echo with command-line arguments
Process tree view of suspicious sequence of exploration activities alert with tainted rundll32.exe child processes showing echo command
Empire: 'whoami /all /fo list' via PowerShell
12.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for powershell.exe executing whoami.exe with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by previous "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" and suspicious PowerShell cmdlet alerts.
Telemetry showing execution sequence of powershell.exe executing whoami.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" alert showing tainted powershell.exe process
Process tree view of powershell.exe with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of user information
12.E.1.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Executed 'whoami' via cmd persistence mechanism through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)
20.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed whoami.exe executing from magnify.exe (tainted by sticky keys binary hijack alert).
Execution sequence showing whoami.exe executing from magnify.exe
Process tree view of sticky keys binary hijack alert showing tainted relationship to whoami.exe
Process Discovery
(T1057)
Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs
2.C.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Cobalt Strike: 'tasklist /v' via cmd
2.C.2
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe executing tasklist.exe with command-line arguments.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert occurred due to a sequence of exploration activities that was classified as suspicious.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for tasklist.exe with command-line arguments
General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities showing tasklist.exe
Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs
3.B.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs
8.B.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Empire: 'qprocess *' via PowerShell
12.C.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for powershell.exe executing qprocess.exe with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by previous "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" and suspicious PowerShell cmdlet alerts.
Telemetry showing execution sequence of powershell.exe executing qprocess.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" alert showing tainted powershell.exe process
Process tree view of powershell.exe with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process
System Service Discovery
(T1007)
Cobalt Strike: 'sc query' via cmd
2.D.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe executing sc.exe with command-line arguments.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert occurred due to a sequence of exploration activities that was classified as suspicious.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for sc.exe with command-line arguments
General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities showing sc.exe
Cobalt Strike: 'net start' via cmd
2.D.2
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments (tainted by the alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities from child processes of rundll32.exe).
Telemetry showing execution sequence for net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of suspicious sequence of exploration activities alert with tainted rundll32.exe child processes showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Empire: 'net start' via PowerShell
12.D.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by a previous suspicious PowerShell cmdlet alert.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert was generated for "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities". Alert is based on the correlation of a chain of related behaviors across multiple steps.
Telemetry showing execution sequence of powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of PowerShell script with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process
General Behavior alert description for "Suspicious sequence of discovery activities"
Process tree view of "Suspicious sequence of discovery activities" alert context with net.exe command-line arguments
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of services
12.E.1.8
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed invocation of the PowerShell cmdlet Get-Service.
Telemetry of execution sequence showing Get-Service invocation
Empire: 'sc query' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate services on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
16.H.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry from CodeRed showed sc.exe command remotely querying services on Creeper (tainted by parent alert on PowerShell script with suspicious content).
Telemetry from CodeRed showing execution sequence of sc.exe service query to Creeper
Parent alert for PowerShell script with suspicious content tainting powershell.exe on CodeRed (alert was generated on many PowerShell script executions throughout the day, specific instance of this procedure not shown in this alert)
Empire: 'sc qc' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
16.J.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry from CodeRed showed sc.exe remote service query on Creeper for the AdobeUpdater service (tainted by parent alert on PowerShell script with suspicious content).
Telemetry from CodeRed showing execution sequence of sc.exe service query for AdobeUpdater on Creeper
Parent alert for PowerShell script with suspicious content tainting powershell.exe on CodeRed (alert was generated on many PowerShell script executions throughout the day, specific instance of this procedure not shown in this alert)
Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key
17.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed reg.exe executing with command-line arguments indicating a check to see if terminal services was enabled (tainted by prior alert on suspicious PowerShell command-line).
Telemetry showing reg.exe query for terminal server setting
Process tree view of suspicious PowerShell command-line alert showing tainted relationship to reg.exe query
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
Cobalt Strike: 'systeminfo' via cmd
2.E.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe running systeminfo.exe.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert occurred due to a sequence of exploration activities that was classified as suspicious.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for systeminfo.exe
General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities showing systeminfo.exe
Cobalt Strike: 'net config workstation' via cmd
2.E.2
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe running net.exe with command-line arguments (tainted by the alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities from child processes of rundll32.exe).
Telemetry showing execution sequence for net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of suspicious sequence of exploration activities alert with tainted rundll32.exe child processes showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information
12.E.1.6.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed invocation of the PowerShell cmdlet Get-SysInfo.
Telemetry of execution sequence showing Get-SysInfo invocation
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of Windows update information
12.E.1.6.2
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed invocation of the PowerShell cmdlet Get-HotFix.
Telemetry of execution sequence showing Get-HotFix invocation
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators' via cmd
2.F.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe running net.exe with command-line arguments.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert occurred due to a sequence of exploration activities that was classified as suspicious.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for net.exe with command-line arguments
General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators /domain' via cmd
2.F.2
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe running net.exe with command-line arguments.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert occurred due to a sequence of exploration activities that was classified as suspicious.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for net.exe with command-line arguments
General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' via cmd
2.F.3
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe running net.exe with command-line arguments.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert occurred due to a sequence of exploration activities that was classified as suspicious.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for net.exe with command-line arguments
General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Telemetry showing domain admins group discovery by Nimda at the domain controller
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AD group memberships
12.E.1.2
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Empire: 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' via PowerShell
12.F.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by a prior suspicious PowerShell cmdlet alert.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert was generated for "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities". Alert is based on the correlation of a chain of related behaviors across multiple steps.
Telemetry of execution sequence showing powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of PowerShell script with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process (specific net.exe instance not shown)
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Empire: 'net localgroup administrators' via PowerShell
12.F.2
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by a prior suspicious PowerShell cmdlet alert.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert was generated for "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities". Alert is based on the correlation of a chain of related behaviors across multiple steps.
Telemetry of execution sequence showing powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of PowerShell script with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process (specific net.exe instance not shown)
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Account Discovery
(T1087)
Cobalt Strike: 'net user /domain' via cmd
2.G.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe running net.exe with command-line arguments.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert occurred due to a sequence of exploration commands that was classified as suspicious.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for net.exe with command-line arguments
General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Cobalt Strike: 'net user george /domain' via cmd
2.G.2
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe running net.exe with command-line arguments.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert occurred due to a sequence of exploration activities that was classified as suspicious.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for net.exe with command-line arguments
General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Telemetry showing discovery of George permissions by Debbie from Nimda at the domain controller
Microsoft Management Console (Local Users and Groups snap-in) GUI utility displayed user account information
7.A.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed execution of mmc.exe, the Microsoft Management Console, spawning the lusrmgr.msc (Local Users and Groups snap-in) which displays local account information.
Telemetry showing mmc.exe running lusrmgr.msc
Empire: 'net user' via PowerShell
12.G.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by a prior suspicious PowerShell cmdlet alert.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert was generated for "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities". Alert is based on the correlation of a chain of related behaviors across multiple steps.
Telemetry of execution sequence showing powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of PowerShell script with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process (specific net.exe instance not shown)
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Empire: 'net user /domain' via PowerShell
12.G.2
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by a prior suspicious PowerShell cmdlet alert.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert was generated for "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities". Alert is based on the correlation of a chain of related behaviors across multiple steps.
Specific Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed Specific Behavior alert called "Reconnaissance using directory services queries" was generated for domain user enumeration. The vendor noted this was an Azure Advanced Threat Protection alert.
Telemetry of execution sequence showing powershell.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of PowerShell script with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process (specific net.exe instance not shown)
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Specific Behavior alert showing domain user enumeration from Bob on CodeRed against Domain Controller on Creeper
Query Registry
(T1012)
Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to enumerate a specific Registry key
2.H.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe running reg.exe with command-line arguments (tainted by the alert on suspicious sequence of exploration activities from child processes of rundll32.exe).
Telemetry showing execution sequence for reg.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on suspicious sequence of discovery techniques (showing tainted reg.exe query command)
Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to remotely enumerate a specific Registry key on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
6.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of reg.exe executing with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by the relationship to prior rundll32.exe activity based on process injection alert context.
Telemetry showing execution sequence for reg.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of suspicious process injection alert on lsass.exe showing tainted relationship to reg.exe (inner failure message in screenshot not relevant to tested functionality)
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information via a Registry query
12.E.1.7
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key
13.C.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed execution of reg.exe with command-line arguments (tainted by suspicious sequence of exploration activities alert).
Telemetry showing execution of reg.exe and command-line arguments
Process tree view of suspicious sequence of exploration activities alert showing tainted relationship to reg.exe
Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key associated with terminal services
17.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed reg.exe executing with command-line arguments (tainted by prior alert on suspicious PowerShell command line).
Telemetry showing reg.exe executing with command-line arguments
Process tree view of suspicious PowerShell command-line alert showing tainted relationship to reg.exe query
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Controllers" /domain' via cmd
4.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments (tainted by the alert on suspicious process injection alert association with rundll32.exe).
Telemetry showing execution sequence for net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of prior suspicious process injection alert showing tainted powershell.exe child cmd.exe process performing this action (specific net.exe command not shown)
Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain' via cmd
4.A.2
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe executing net.exe with command-line arguments (tainted by the alert on suspicious process injection alert association with rundll32.exe).
Telemetry showing execution sequence for net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of prior suspicious process injection alert showing tainted powershell.exe child cmd.exe process performing this action (specific net.exe command not shown)
Empire: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain' via PowerShell
13.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed execution of net.exe with command-line arguments (tainted by parent PowerShell malicious cmdlet alert).
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert was generated for "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities". Alert is based on the correlation of a chain of related behaviors across multiple steps.
Telemetry showing execution of net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of PowerShell script with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process (specific net.exe instance not shown)
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" showing net.exe with command-line arguments
System Network Connections Discovery
(T1049)
Cobalt Strike: 'netstat -ano' via cmd
4.C.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence of cmd.exe executing netstat.exe with command-line arguments (tainted by the alert on suspicious process injection alert association with rundll32.exe).
Telemetry showing execution sequence for netstat.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of prior suspicious process injection alert showing tainted powershell.exe child cmd.exe process performing this action (specific netstat.exe command not shown)
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of established network connections
12.E.1.12
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed invocation of the PowerShell cmdlet Get-NetInfo and subsequent execution of netstat.exe with command-line arguments from powershell.exe. The telemetry was tainted by a prior suspicious PowerShell cmdlet alert.
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert was generated for "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities". Alert is based on the correlation of a chain of related behaviors across multiple steps.
Telemetry of execution sequence showing Get-NetInfo invocation
Telemetry of execution sequence showing powershell.exe executing netstat.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of PowerShell script with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" showing netstat.exe with command-line arguments
Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell
13.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed execution of net.exe with command-line arguments (tainted by parent PowerShell malicious cmdlet alert).
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert was generated for "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities". Alert is based on the correlation of a chain of related behaviors across multiple steps.
Telemetry showing execution of net.exe with command-line arguments
Process tree view of PowerShell script with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process (specific net.exe instance not shown)
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" showing net.exe with command-line arguments
Empire: 'netstat -ano' via PowerShell
13.B.2
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed execution of netstat.exe (tainted by parent PowerShell malicious cmdlet alert).
General Behavior (Delayed)
  
 
A delayed General Behavior alert was generated for "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities". Alert is based on the correlation of a chain of related behaviors across multiple steps.
Telemetry showing execution of netstat.exe (tainted by parent PowerShell malicious cmdlet alert)
Process tree view of PowerShell script with malicious cmdlets alert showing tainted powershell.exe process (specific netstat.exe instance not shown)
Process tree view of General Behavior alert on "Suspicious sequence of exploration activities" showing netstat.exe with command-line arguments
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
Cobalt Strike: 'dir /s /b "\\conficker\wormshare"' via cmd
8.A.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for cmd.exe executing dir with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by a prior alert on rundll32.exe being executed without command-line arguments.
Telemetry showing execution sequence of cmd.exe executing dir with command-line arguments
Process tree view of rundll32.exe "Unexpected behavior from process run with no command-line arguments" alert that tainted dir (dir command not shown)
Cobalt Strike: 'tree "C:\Users\debbie"' via cmd
8.A.2
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed the execution sequence for cmd.exe executing tree.com with command-line arguments. The telemetry was tainted by a prior alert on rundll32.exe being executed without command-line arguments.
Telemetry showing execution sequence of cmd.exe executing tree.com with command-line arguments
Process tree view of rundll32.exe "Unexpected behavior from process run with no command-line arguments" alert that tainted tree (tree command not shown)
Cobalt Strike: 'ls' (List) via Win32 APIs to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
9.A.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of recently opened files
12.E.1.4.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of interesting files
12.E.1.4.2
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Empire: 'type' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific file (update.vbs) on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
16.K.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Empire: 'Get-ChildItem' via PowerShell to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)
18.A.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed the decoded PowerShell script that was executed to recursively search for .vsdx files on Conficker\'s remote file share.
Query showing .vsdx PowerShell file search script that was executed
Application Window Discovery
(T1010)
Cobalt Strike: Keylogging capability included residual enumeration of application windows
8.C.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Empire: Built-in keylogging module included residual enumeration of application windows
15.A.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Password Policy Discovery
(T1201)
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of password policy information
12.E.1.3
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Network Share Discovery
(T1135)
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of available shares
12.E.1.9.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of mapped network drives
12.E.1.9.2
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AV solutions
12.E.1.10.1
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of firewall rules
12.E.1.10.2
None
  
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.







Operational Flow

The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

Step 1: Initial Compromise

1.A.1 Execution

User Execution, Rundll32, Scripting

i. Legitimate user Debbie clicked and executed malicious self-extracting archive (Resume Viewer.exe) on 10.0.1.6 (Nimda)

1.B.1 Persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

i. Previously executed batch file (pdfhelper.cmd) moved a separate batch file (autoupdate.bat) to the Startup folder

1.C.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Data Encoding, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established

Step 2: Initial Discover

2.A.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ipconfig /all' via cmd

2.A.2 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'arp -a' via cmd

2.B.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'echo' via cmd to enumerate specific environment variables

2.C.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

2.C.2 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'tasklist /v' via cmd

2.D.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'sc query' via cmd

2.D.2 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net start' via cmd

2.E.1 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'systeminfo' via cmd

2.E.2 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net config workstation' via cmd

2.F.1 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators' via cmd

2.F.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators /domain' via cmd

2.F.3 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' via cmd

2.G.1 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net user /domain' via cmd

2.G.2 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net user george /domain' via cmd

2.H.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to enumerate a specific Registry key

Step 3: Privilege Escalation

3.A.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Access Token Manipulation, Bypass User Account Control

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication capability executed to elevate process integrity level

3.B.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

3.C.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in process injection capability executed to inject callback into cmd.exe

Step 4: Discovery for Lateral Movement

4.A.1 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Controllers" /domain' via cmd

4.A.2 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain' via cmd

4.B.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'netsh advfirewall show allprofiles' via cmd

4.C.1 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'netstat -ano' via cmd

Step 5: Credential Access

5.A.1 Credential Access

Credential Dumping, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in Mimikatz credential dump capability executed

5.A.2 Credential Access

Credential Dumping, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in hash dump capability executed

5.B.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Access Token Manipulation

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in token theft capability executed to change user context to George

Step 6: Lateral Movement

6.A.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to remotely enumerate a specific Registry key on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

6.B.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Multiband Communication, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified

6.C.1 Lateral Movement

Remote Desktop Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to proxy RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 7: Persistence

7.A.1 Persistence

Create Account, Graphical user Interface, Account Discovery

i. Added user Jesse to Conficker (10.0.0.5) through RDP connection

7.B.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in upload capability executed to write a DLL payload (updater.dll) to disk on Nimda (10.0.1.6)

7.C.1 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Scheduled Task

i. Cobalt Strike: 'schtasks' via cmd to create scheduled task that executes a DLL payload (updater.dll)

Step 8: Collection

8.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'dir /s /b "\\conficker\wormshare"' via cmd

8.A.2 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'tree "C:\Users\debbie"' via cmd

8.B.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

8.C.1 Collection, Credential Access

Input Capture, Application Window Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in keylogging capability executed to capture keystrokes of user Debbie

8.D.1 Collection

Screen Capture, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in screen capture capability executed to capture screenshot of current window of user Debbie

Step 9: Exfiltration

9.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ls' (List) via Win32 APIs to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

9.B.1 Collection

Data from Data from Network Shared Drive, Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in download capability executed to a collect file (Shockwave_rackb_diagram.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 10: Execution of Persistence

10.A.1 Persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

i. Batch file (autoupdate.bat) previously written to Startup folder executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (update.dat) using Rundll32

10.A.2 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Scheduled Task

i. Scheduled task executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (updater.dll) using Rundll32

10.B.1 Lateral Movement

Remote Desktop Protocol, Valid Accounts

i. RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5) authenticated using previously added user Jesse

Step 11: Initial Access

11.A.1 Defense Evasion, Execution

Scripting

i. Legitimate user Bob clicked and executed malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) on 10.0.1.5 (CodeRed)

11.B.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Standard Application Layer Protocol, Standard Cryptographic Protocol

i. Empire: C2 channel established

Step 12: Initial Discover

12.A.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: 'route print' via PowerShell

12.A.2 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: 'ipconfig /all' via PowerShell

12.B.1 Discovery

System Owner/User Discovery

i. Empire: 'whoami /all /fo list' via PowerShell

12.C.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Empire: 'qprocess *' via PowerShell

12.D.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'net start' via PowerShell

12.E.1 Defense Evasion, Execution

Scripting

i. Empire: Built-in WinEnum module executed to programmatically execute a series of enumeration techniques

12.E.1.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of user information

12.E.1.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AD group memberships

12.E.1.3 Discovery

Password Policy Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of password policy information

12.E.1.4.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of recently opened files

12.E.1.4.2 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of interesting files

12.E.1.5 Collection

Clipboard Data

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of clipboard contents

12.E.1.6.1 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information

12.E.1.6.2 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of Windows update information

12.E.1.7 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information via a Registry query

12.E.1.8 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of services

12.E.1.9.1 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of available shares

12.E.1.9.2 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of mapped network drives

12.E.1.10.1 Discovery

Security Software Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AV solutions

12.E.1.10.2 Discovery

Security Software Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of firewall rules

12.E.1.11 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of network adapters

12.E.1.12 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of established network connections

12.F.1 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' via PowerShell

12.F.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: 'net localgroup administrators' via PowerShell

12.G.1 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Empire: 'net user' via PowerShell

12.G.2 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Empire: 'net user /domain' via PowerShell

Step 13: Discovery for Lateral Movement

13.A.1 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Empire: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain' via PowerShell

13.B.1 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell

13.B.2 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: 'netstat -ano' via PowerShell

13.C.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key

Step 14: Privilege Escalation

14.A.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Bypass User Account Control, Commonly Used Port, Remote File Copy, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded and executed a new Empire stager (wdbypass)

Step 15: Credential Access

15.A.1 Discovery

Application Window Discovery, Input Capture

i. Empire: Built-in keylogging module executed to capture keystrokes of user Bob

15.B.1 Credential Access

Credentials in Files

i. Empire: 'get-content' via PowerShell to collect sensitive file (it_tasks.txt) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 16: Lateral Movement

16.A.1 Credential Access

Brute Force, Windows Admin Shares

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to brute force password spraying authentication attempts to Morris (10.0.1.4) and Nimda (10.0.1.6) targeting credentials of users Kmitnick, Bob, and Frieda

16.B.1 Lateral Movement

Windows Admin Shares, Valid Accounts , Brute Force

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to successfully authenticate to Conficker (10.0.0.5) using credentials of user Kmitnick

16.C.1 Defense Evasion

Network Share Connection Removal

i. Empire: 'net use /delete' via PowerShell

16.D.1 Lateral Movement

Windows Admin Shares, Valid Accounts

i. Empire: Successful authentication targeted Windows admin shares on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

16.E.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

16.F.1 Execution

Command-Line Interface

i. Empire: Built-in runas module executed to launch malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) as user Kmitnick

16.G.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in move capability executed to write malicious VBScript (update.vbs) to disk on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.H.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'sc query' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate services on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.I.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

New Service, Masquerading

i. Empire: 'sc create' via PowerShell to remotely create a service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.J.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'sc qc' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.K.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: 'type' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific file (update.vbs) on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.L.1 Execution

Service Execution

i. Empire: 'sc start' via PowerShell to remotely launch a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

Step 17: Persistence

17.A.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery, Query Registry

i. Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key associated with terminal services

17.B.1 Defense Evasion

File Permissions Modification

i. Empire: 'takeown' via PowerShell to obtain ownership of magnify.exe

17.B.2 Defense Evasion

File Permissions Modification

i. Empire: 'icacls' via PowerShell to modify the DACL for magnify.exe

17.C.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Accessibility Features

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell to overwrite magnify.exe with cmd.exe

Step 18: Collection

18.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: 'Get-ChildItem' via PowerShell to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

18.B.1 Collection

Data Staged, Data from Network Shared Drive

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell staged a file (Shockwave_network.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5) in the Recycle Bin (C:\$Recycle.Bin) on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

Step 19: Exfiltration

19.A.1 Defense Evasion

Masquerading, Remote File Copy

i. Empire: File dropped to disk is a renamed copy of the WinRAR binary

19.B.1 Exfiltration

Data Compressed, Data Encrypted, Masquerading

i. Empire: Executed binary (recycler.exe) created compressed archive (old.rar) of previously collected file

19.C.1 Exfiltration

Exfiltration over Alternative Protocol

i. Empire: Sequence of 'echo' commands via PowerShell to populate commands in text file (ftp.txt), which is then executed by FTP to exfil data through network connection separate of existing C2 channel

19.D.1 Defense Evasion

File Deletion

i. Empire: 'del C:\"$"Recycle.bin\old.rar'

19.D.2 Defense Evasion

File Deletion

i. Empire: 'del recycler.exe'

Step 20: Execution of Persistence

20.A.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Accessibility Features, Remote Desktop Protocol

i. magnifer.exe previously overwritten by cmd.exe launched through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)

20.B.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Executed 'whoami' via cmd persistence mechanism through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)