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Tactic Results: Privilege Escalation Tactic Page Information

The ATT&CK tactic page displays all tested techniques belonging to that tactic, as well as all procedures and their respective detections. The procedures are grouped by their technique. The Procedure column contains a description of how the technique was tested. The Step column is where in the operational flow the procedure occurred. Click the Step Number to view it in the Operational Flow panel. Detections are classified by one or more Detection Types, summarized by the Detection Notes, and may be supported by Screenshots. The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

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Vendor Configuration      All Results     JSON     Legend
Legend
Main Detection Categories: Detection Modifiers:

None

Telemetry

Indicator of Compromise

General Behavior

Specific Behavior

Enrichment

Tainted

Delayed

Configuration Change
Technique
Procedures Step
Detection Type Detection Notes
Screenshots
Access Token Manipulation
(T1134)
Cobalt Strike: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication capability executed to modify current process token
3.A.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed svchost.exe executed with the seclogon command-line argument and a subsequent logon event with an elevated token and new logon ID, indicating token manipulation.
Telemetry showing svchost.exe executed with the seclogon command-line argument
Telemetry showing logon event with an elevated token and new logon ID
Cobalt Strike: Built-in token theft capability executed to change user context to George
5.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed a cmd.exe associated with user Debbie spawn a cmd.exe associated with user George, indicating user context change via token manipulation. The telemetry was tainted by a parent process injection alert on cmd.exe.
Telemetry showing a cmd.exe associated with user Debbie spawn a cmd.exe associated with user George, indicating user context change via token manipulation (tainted by a parent process injection alert on cmd.exe)
Bypass User Account Control
(T1088)
Cobalt Strike: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication capability executed to elevate process integrity level
3.A.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed a process integrity level change from parent rundll32.exe (medium / 8192) to child powershell.exe (high / 12288), both running as user Debbie.
Telemetry showing process integrity level change from parent rundll32.exe (medium) to child powershell.exe (high), both running as user Debbie
Empire: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication module executed to launch new callback with elevated process integrity level
14.A.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed a process integrity level change from parent powershell.exe (medium / 8192) to child powershell.exe (high / 12288).
Indicator of Compromise
  
An Indicator of Compromise alert was generated identifying a PowerShell Empire script performing the bypass UAC attack.
Telemetry showing powershell.exe running as medium integrity level (8192)
Telemetry showing powershell.exe running as high integrity level (12288)
Indicator of Compromise alert identifying a PowerShell Empire script performing the bypass UAC attack.
Process Injection
(T1055)
Cobalt Strike: Built-in process injection capability executed to inject callback into cmd.exe
3.C.1
Specific Behavior (Tainted)
  
 
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for PowerShell injecting shellcode. The alert was tainted by a parent alert related to Resume Viewer.exe and suspicious execution of the Windows Scripting Engine. The process tree showing taintedness is visible within the same UI but did not fit within the current frame.
Specific Behavior alert for PowerShell injecting shellcode (tainted by a parent alert related to Resume Viewer.exe and suspicious execution of the Windows Scripting Engine)
Cobalt Strike: Credential dump capability involved process injection into lsass
5.A.1
Specific Behavior
  
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for a suspicious handle being opened to lsass.exe. The alert was tagged with a related ATT&CK Technique (Credential Dumping). Vendor stated the capability would have prevented this behavior.
A Specific Behavior alert for a suspicious handle being opened to lsass.exe, tagged with a related ATT&CK Technique (Credential Dumping)
Cobalt Strike: Hash dump capability involved process injection into lsass.exe
5.A.2
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed a code injection into lsass.exe. The telemetry was tainted by a parent process injection alert on cmd.exe.
Telemetry showing a code injection into lsass.exe (tainted by a parent process injection alert on cmd.exe)
Cobalt Strike: Screen capture capability involved process injection into explorer.exe
8.D.1
Enrichment
  
The capability enriched cmd.exe injecting into explorer.exe as code injection via CreateThread.
Enrichment of cmd.exe injecting into explorer.exe as code injection via CreateThread
Valid Accounts
(T1078)
RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5) authenticated using previously added user Jesse
10.B.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed userinit.exe as well as explorer.exe spawn as the user Jesse.
Telemetry showing userinit.exe as well as explorer.exe spawn as the user Jesse
Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to successfully authenticate to Conficker (10.0.0.5) using credentials of user Kmitnick
16.B.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed a net.exe logon attempt to ADMIN$ on 10.0.0.5 (Conficker) using valid credentials for user Kmitnick followed by an event for the credentials being validated by the DC. The telemetry was tainted by a parent alert on wscript.exe.
Enrichment
  
The capability enriched an lsass.exe event with the correct ATT&CK Technique (Valid Accounts).
Telemetry showing a net.exe logon attempt to ADMIN$ on 10.0.0.5 (Conficker) using valid credentials for user Kmitnick (tainted by a parent alert on wscript.exe)
Telemetry showing an event for the logon credentials being validated by the DC (tainted by a parent alert on wscript.exe)
Enrichment of an lsass.exe event with the correct ATT&CK Technique (Valid Accounts).
Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to successfully authenticate to Creeper (10.0.0.4) using credentials of user Kmitnick
16.D.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed a net.exe logon attempt to C$ on 10.0.0.4 (Creeper) using valid credentials for user Kmitnick followed by a event for a successful login. The telemetry was tainted by a parent alert on wscript.exe.
Telemetry showing a net.exe logon attempt to C$ on 10.0.0.4 (Creeper) using valid credentials for user Kmitnick (tainted by a parent alert on wscript.exe)
Telemetry showing a event for a successful login by user Kmitnick (tainted by a parent alert on wscript.exe)
New Service
(T1050)
Empire: 'sc create' via PowerShell to remotely create a service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)
16.I.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed execution of sc.exe with command-line arguments to create a new AdobeUpdater service containing a binPath pointed to cmd.exe with arguments to execute update.vbs. Telemetry also showed the creation of Registry keys associated with this new service. The telemetry was tainted by a parent alert on wscript.exe.
Specific Behavior (Tainted)
  
 
A Specific Behavior alert was generated for a new service created via the command line. The alert was tainted by a parent alert on wscript.exe.
Enrichment
  
The capability enriched sc.exe executing with the correct ATT&CK Technique (New Service).
Telemetry showing execution of sc.exe to create a new AdobeUpdater service (tainted by a parent alert on wscript.exe)
Telemetry showing the creation of Registry keys associated with the AdobeUpdater service
Specific Behavior alert for a new service created via the command line (tainted by a parent alert on wscript.exe)
Enrichment of sc.exe executing with the correct ATT&CK Technique (New Service)
Accessibility Features
(T1015)
Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell to overwrite magnify.exe with cmd.exe
17.C.1
Telemetry (Tainted)
  
 
Telemetry showed file write events overwriting magnify.exe in the system directory as well as the change in the hash of the file. The telemetry was tainted by a parent alert on cmd.exe. The process tree showing taintedness is visible within the same UI but did not fit within the current frame.
Telemetry showing file write events overwriting magnify.exe in the system directory (tainted by a parent alert on cmd.exe)
Telemetry showing change in the hash of magnify.exe
magnifer.exe previously overwritten by cmd.exe launched through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)
20.A.1
Telemetry
  
Telemetry showed magnify.exe executing from utilman.exe.
Telemetry showing magnify.exe executing from utilman.exe







Operational Flow The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

Step 1: Initial Compromise

1.A.1 Execution

User Execution, Rundll32, Scripting

i. Legitimate user Debbie clicked and executed malicious self-extracting archive (Resume Viewer.exe) on 10.0.1.6 (Nimda)

1.B.1 Persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

i. Previously executed batch file (pdfhelper.cmd) moved a separate batch file (autoupdate.bat) to the Startup folder

1.C.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Data Encoding, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel established

Step 2: Initial Discover

2.A.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ipconfig /all' via cmd

2.A.2 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'arp -a' via cmd

2.B.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'echo' via cmd to enumerate specific environment variables

2.C.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

2.C.2 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'tasklist /v' via cmd

2.D.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'sc query' via cmd

2.D.2 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net start' via cmd

2.E.1 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'systeminfo' via cmd

2.E.2 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net config workstation' via cmd

2.F.1 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators' via cmd

2.F.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net localgroup administrators /domain' via cmd

2.F.3 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' via cmd

2.G.1 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net user /domain' via cmd

2.G.2 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net user george /domain' via cmd

2.H.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to enumerate a specific Registry key

Step 3: Privilege Escalation

3.A.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Access Token Manipulation, Bypass User Account Control

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in UAC bypass token duplication capability executed to elevate process integrity level

3.B.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

3.C.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in process injection capability executed to inject callback into cmd.exe

Step 4: Discovery for Lateral Movement

4.A.1 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Controllers" /domain' via cmd

4.A.2 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain' via cmd

4.B.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'netsh advfirewall show allprofiles' via cmd

4.C.1 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'netstat -ano' via cmd

Step 5: Credential Access

5.A.1 Credential Access

Credential Dumping, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in Mimikatz credential dump capability executed

5.A.2 Credential Access

Credential Dumping, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in hash dump capability executed

5.B.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Access Token Manipulation

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in token theft capability executed to change user context to George

Step 6: Lateral Movement

6.A.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Cobalt Strike: 'reg query' via cmd to remotely enumerate a specific Registry key on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

6.B.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Multiband Communication, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified

6.C.1 Lateral Movement

Remote Desktop Protocol

i. Cobalt Strike: C2 channel modified to proxy RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 7: Persistence

7.A.1 Persistence

Create Account, Graphical User Interface, Account Discovery

i. Added user Jesse to Conficker (10.0.0.5) through RDP connection

7.B.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in upload capability executed to write a DLL payload (updater.dll) to disk on Nimda (10.0.1.6)

7.C.1 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Scheduled Task

i. Cobalt Strike: 'schtasks' via cmd to create scheduled task that executes a DLL payload (updater.dll)

Step 8: Collection

8.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'dir /s /b "\\conficker\wormshare"' via cmd

8.A.2 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'tree "C:\Users\debbie"' via cmd

8.B.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ps' (Process status) via Win32 APIs

8.C.1 Collection, Credential Access

Input Capture, Application Window Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in keylogging capability executed to capture keystrokes of user Debbie

8.D.1 Collection

Screen Capture, Process Injection

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in screen capture capability executed to capture screenshot of current window of user Debbie

Step 9: Exfiltration

9.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Cobalt Strike: 'ls' (List) via Win32 APIs to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

9.B.1 Collection

Data from Network Shared Drive, Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel

i. Cobalt Strike: Built-in download capability executed to a collect file (Shockwave_rackb_diagram.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 10: Execution of Persistence

10.A.1 Persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

i. Batch file (autoupdate.bat) previously written to Startup folder executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (update.dat) using Rundll32

10.A.2 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Scheduled Task

i. Scheduled task executed when user Debbie logs on to Nimda (10.0.1.6), launching a DLL payload (updater.dll) using Rundll32

10.B.1 Lateral Movement

Remote Desktop Protocol, Valid Accounts

i. RDP connection to Conficker (10.0.0.5) authenticated using previously added user Jesse

Step 11: Initial Access

11.A.1 Defense Evasion, Execution

Scripting

i. Legitimate user Bob clicked and executed malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) on 10.0.1.5 (CodeRed)

11.B.1 Command and Control

Commonly Used Port, Standard Application Layer Protocol, Standard Cryptographic Protocol

i. Empire: C2 channel established

Step 12: Initial Discover

12.A.1 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: 'route print' via PowerShell

12.A.2 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: 'ipconfig /all' via PowerShell

12.B.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Empire: 'whoami /all /fo list' via PowerShell

12.C.1 Discovery

Process Discovery

i. Empire: 'qprocess *' via PowerShell

12.D.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'net start' via PowerShell

12.E.1 Defense Evasion, Execution

Scripting

i. Empire: Built-in WinEnum module executed to programmatically execute a series of enumeration techniques

12.E.1.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of user information

12.E.1.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AD group memberships

12.E.1.3 Discovery

Password Policy Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of password policy information

12.E.1.4.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of recently opened files

12.E.1.4.2 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of interesting files

12.E.1.5 Collection

Clipboard Data

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of clipboard contents

12.E.1.6.1 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information

12.E.1.6.2 Discovery

System Information Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of Windows update information

12.E.1.7 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of system information via a Registry query

12.E.1.8 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of services

12.E.1.9.1 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of available shares

12.E.1.9.2 Discovery

Network Share Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of mapped network drives

12.E.1.10.1 Discovery

Security Software Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of AV solutions

12.E.1.10.2 Discovery

Security Software Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of firewall rules

12.E.1.11 Discovery

System Network Configuration Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of network adapters

12.E.1.12 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: WinEnum module included enumeration of established network connections

12.F.1 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain' via PowerShell

12.F.2 Discovery

Permission Groups Discovery

i. Empire: 'net localgroup administrators' via PowerShell

12.G.1 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Empire: 'net user' via PowerShell

12.G.2 Discovery

Account Discovery

i. Empire: 'net user /domain' via PowerShell

Step 13: Discovery for Lateral Movement

13.A.1 Discovery

Remote System Discovery

i. Empire: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain' via PowerShell

13.B.1 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell

13.B.2 Discovery

System Network Connections Discovery

i. Empire: 'netstat -ano' via PowerShell

13.C.1 Discovery

Query Registry

i. Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key

Step 14: Privilege Escalation

14.A.1 Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Bypass User Account Control, Commonly Used Port, Remote File Copy, Standard Application Layer Protocol

i. Empire: UAC bypass module downloaded and executed a new Empire stager (wdbypass)

Step 15: Credential Access

15.A.1 Discovery

Application Window Discovery, Input Capture

i. Empire: Built-in keylogging module executed to capture keystrokes of user Bob

15.B.1 Credential Access

Credentials in Files

i. Empire: 'get-content' via PowerShell to collect sensitive file (it_tasks.txt) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

Step 16: Lateral Movement

16.A.1 Credential Access

Brute Force, Windows Admin Shares

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to brute force password spraying authentication attempts to Morris (10.0.1.4) and Nimda (10.0.1.6) targeting credentials of users Kmitnick, Bob, and Frieda

16.B.1 Lateral Movement

Windows Admin Shares, Valid Accounts, Brute Force

i. Empire: 'net use' via PowerShell to successfully authenticate to Conficker (10.0.0.5) using credentials of user Kmitnick

16.C.1 Defense Evasion

Network Share Connection Removal

i. Empire: 'net use /delete' via PowerShell

16.D.1 Lateral Movement

Windows Admin Shares, Valid Accounts

i. Empire: Successful authentication targeted Windows admin shares on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

16.E.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in upload module executed to write malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) to disk on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

16.F.1 Execution

Command-Line Interface

i. Empire: Built-in runas module executed to launch malicious VBScript (autoupdate.vbs) as user Kmitnick

16.G.1 Command and Control, Lateral Movement

Remote File Copy

i. Empire: Built-in move capability executed to write malicious VBScript (update.vbs) to disk on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.H.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'sc query' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate services on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.I.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

New Service, Masquerading

i. Empire: 'sc create' via PowerShell to remotely create a service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.J.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery

i. Empire: 'sc qc' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.K.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: 'type' via PowerShell to remotely enumerate a specific file (update.vbs) on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

16.L.1 Execution

Service Execution

i. Empire: 'sc start' via PowerShell to remotely launch a specific service on Creeper (10.0.0.4)

Step 17: Persistence

17.A.1 Discovery

System Service Discovery, Query Registry

i. Empire: 'reg query' via PowerShell to enumerate a specific Registry key associated with terminal services

17.B.1 Defense Evasion

File Permissions Modification

i. Empire: 'takeown' via PowerShell to obtain ownership of magnify.exe

17.B.2 Defense Evasion

File Permissions Modification

i. Empire: 'icacls' via PowerShell to modify the DACL for magnify.exe

17.C.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Accessibility Features

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell to overwrite magnify.exe with cmd.exe

Step 18: Collection

18.A.1 Discovery

File and Directory Discovery

i. Empire: 'Get-ChildItem' via PowerShell to enumerate a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5)

18.B.1 Collection

Data Staged, Data from Network Shared Drive

i. Empire: 'copy' via PowerShell staged a file (Shockwave_network.vsdx) from a network shared drive (Wormshare) on Conficker (10.0.0.5) in the Recycle Bin (C:\$Recycle.Bin) on CodeRed (10.0.1.5)

Step 19: Exfiltration

19.A.1 Defense Evasion

Masquerading, Remote File Copy

i. Empire: File dropped to disk is a renamed copy of the WinRAR binary

19.B.1 Exfiltration

Data Compressed, Data Encrypted, Masquerading

i. Empire: Executed binary (recycler.exe) created compressed archive (old.rar) of previously collected file

19.C.1 Exfiltration

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

i. Empire: Sequence of 'echo' commands via PowerShell to populate commands in text file (ftp.txt), which is then executed by FTP to exfil data through network connection separate of existing C2 channel

19.D.1 Defense Evasion

File Deletion

i. Empire: 'del C:\"$"Recycle.bin\old.rar'

19.D.2 Defense Evasion

File Deletion

i. Empire: 'del recycler.exe'

Step 20: Execution of Persistence

20.A.1 Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Accessibility Features, Remote Desktop Protocol

i. magnifer.exe previously overwritten by cmd.exe launched through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)

20.B.1 Discovery

System Owner / User Discovery

i. Executed 'whoami' via cmd persistence mechanism through RDP connection made to Creeper (10.0.0.4)